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IHTROWCTION 
Labor t s participat.ion in politics is not sanething new. 'l'he first 
labor parties in the world appeared in the United Sta.tes, and tor almost a 
century and a quarter now, this participation has never ceased in one torm ot 
political activity or another. When the Workingmen's Parties began to torm in 
the 18)0' s, they urged their members to nominate candidat.es tor publio ottice. 
IWhen t.hey did, the Mechanics l Union ot Trade Assooiations in Philadelphia broke 
tresh ground tor labor and inaugurated what was to become a widespread. politic': 
movement ot worldngraen1s part,ies. It soon spread to other towns in PennsylvazW 
and New York. There, w1de popular support developed not only tor local parties 
in New York itselt, but in many upstate localities and in J(usa.ohusetts and 
other parts ot New England. Ultimately, workingmen's parties were established 
in appro.x1matell' a dozen states. As tar west as Ohio, as well as along the 
Atlantic seaboard, local groups ot mechanios, artisans and tarmers backed their 
own political candidates and in llW'l1' instances elected 1ihem. For some time 
they held swaJ in the struggle tor political power, and oooasionally were the 
balance ot power between the two major parties in looal elections. 
Out at these adventures into politics there developed three patterns 
ot political behavior. One looks in the direction ot establishing and main-
11" 
2 
• 
taining independent parties) local, at.ate and national 1n scope, either alone 
or. in eonjunctlon with farmers or others. A majority ot those who nave tread 
th18 path have been doomed to ta11ure. But it is .interesting to note that a 
study on op4.n1one ot labor leaders here in the United States (one lnd1v1.dlal 
w&8 trom Canada) started in 1941 b,. C, Wright Mills with the ue1atance ot 
Mildred Atkinson ot the University of J4ar;yland showed, among ot.her thl,ug8, 
that 13 pel" cent ot the AFL and 23 p&reent ot the elO wanted a National Labor 
Party then. 
On the other hand, when they' were asked the question it they wanted 
a labor party within the next ten years, 23 per cent or the AFL and 52 per cent 
ot the elO answered in the attirmative.l 
A second pattern or political action grows out ot the support given 
by indivichal union mtll'lll::lers and labor organizations to revolutionary political 
parties, the vast majority ot which have been influenced by the Marxian theory 
ot Socialism and Communism. The essential core ot their membership has come 
trom the rank and rUe ot workers, «4 though a small. element has been drawn from 
the middle-class strata. 
The third pattern consists in what is traditionally called Itnon-
partisan political action." That i8, it politically favors those who favor 
labor. 
A studT ot Labor's political history has shown the advocates of thia 
third pattern that no~Uan .polit1cal action ia the beat one to follow. troio, fa 
1 J. B. S. Hardman and Ma.ttrice F. NeuJ."eld, et al. , !b! ~ E! 
Labor, }Jew York, 1951, 42. 
have at all times in the past been int$rested in legislation and hence in 
politics. 
The formation ot the Crots Political Action Committee, the AlL's 
Labor' as League for Poll tical EdUcation, and similar setup. in the major 
inciependent u.nions, Signifies not a novel departure in unionism, bu. t a 
rising de'termination to make effective UN of the franchise, and a dia-
position to streamline the older ways of doing things political17.2 
This idea or political action by labor unions on the nonpartisan 
principle as exemplified by the CIO was predicted in 1931 by the future Senator 
Paul Douglas (D. Ill.) when he stated that a new labor organization and the 
political philosophy with wbich it would cloak itself was DOt tar otfa 
Nor • • • will the American wage earners permanently content them-
aelves with their present unorganized conditions. Sometime sooner or 
later the great mass-prodUction industries ot iron and steel, textiles, 
chemicals and autom.obiles will probably be faced wi tb a. labor movement 
wrdeh welfare capitE.i.lisDl will tind it difficult to avert. When this 
organization starts, the workers will find that it the local, atate, 
and national governments are in the hands of their opponents, their own 
efforts will tend to be defeated by the pressure which the state can and. 
will tend to exert against them through the local and state police. In 
such a position they will naturally turn to political action.) 
The history or labor political action has had two distinct trenda 
and labor organizations have alternated between these trends spasmOdically, 
seeking a path that would lead them to their goal. Either they plunged with 
fervor into the building ot a separate labor o.r "thirdu party or else they 
religiously refrained from participation in the political processes and sought 
to exert their influence only in specific instances and on specific issues. 
Abstention had certain .eriQUs drawbacks, the most obvious of which 
2 Ibid., 75 
) Paul Douglas, The American Political Science Review, Menasha, 
Wisconsin, November I 1931, SS; 
~ .. that t.he pollt1.cal 1ntluence or a large group, In.,, the popIll.at.iOD va. net.ttral. 
i8ed and other group., 1 ••• ru.meroua but. be\ter-heel.8p and J'ION &ct.1" and vocal; 
lWere able to illflu.eMe elections and legislation to t.heir own adv'antage. With-
out an effective method of enforcing their wiabe8, represeotatlvea of labQl" 
organiz.ations 001114 do little fAore tban plead the Justice or tlleir cause in the 
state and 1l&tio~ legislative halls. i1.nd jUltice 'Was not aJ:wqe the compell1l'li 
faotAr 10 legislation that was pas .. 
With W8 aU .. part, of b1storT. the CIa lau.nched ita PAC in 1943. 
Today the CIO-PAC Board. oo_18t. of tbe presldent.8 and 8eoretar1'-treuu.ren of 
tbe CIO-. six larg •• t unions (United Steelworkers, Uo.lted ~t.o WOrkur., CCISal-
ntcatioJl8 ~;orkeraJ Textile liorkel'8, Amalgamated ClotbiDg Workerr8 and United 
.tt.ubber ti'Vkel"s) and a direotor. It 11 reapo.ns1ble to t.he ero convention and, 
in the in\er1ra, to tM CIa Uecutlve Board. 
Operating thrOl1gh their unions. t.heT are the people who do the polltloal actioD 
work or \;10 and. the people who in the tinal analyala, determine the political. 
direetion ot CIG-PAC. 
In th1a factor 1188 a Great deal or the 3trength at Cro-.t'AC, tor it.. , 
Ol'gwu,u.tional. bue 18 the union, in which _n and. WOlItm. are bound olOlely to-
gether by economic lell-interest' rather t.haD t.he looser partY' organ1zatton 1n 
which the cetl'!ent is patronage or sel.t-",;gr&nd1z_ent. 
The men and women Of cro who encase in polit.1cal action do 80 as a 
mati.er at prineiple ratber tb.n as a _ttel' ot Mlt advancement. They are 
seeking the passage ot & particular piace ot legislation or the election ot a 
part.1oIl1U" caad1d.ate Dec ... se ~ b.u.ve in the ,legislat1on or the candidate. 
5 
delegate boqy concerned primarily with the elect10n of the congressional can-
di&te from that wtr1ct. It is in being principally in the large cities ot 
the nation which are represented by a number of congressmen (such as Chicago, 
Philadelphia, ect.). 
On the next higher level are the State Political Action Committees. 
These are often more torm.al in their nature than the city or county PAC. or the 
Congressional Districts PACS in that they have constitutions and by-laws and 
procedures that are in accordanoe with a fixed pattern. Virtually all states 
now have Political Action Committees which are formally established and operate 
under constitutions and by-laws. 
The national office ot the Clo-PAC, now located in Washington, D. C. 
in a suite occupied in 1948 by the Dewey-Warren clubs, is the otfice ot the 
Director and h1s staft. 
In contrast to the 1.35 people employed in 1944, the OIO-PAO national 
staff now consists of the director and seven people, pllls clerical statf, whose 
regular asaigment is in the Washington office. Four additional people are on 
tpe (aO-PAC payroll as full t.ime representatives and they cover the entire 
nation. 
The Washington statr, allot whom perform field work, consists of the 
director, assistant director, & comptroller, two public relations people and 
three research. people. the tour regionalrepresenta'titfes cover the New England 
and Middle Atlantic Stat-es, the South, the Middle West, the, Far West and 
.Mount.ain States, respeetivel7.· 
from time to time, the st.aff 18 augmented by the addition or part,. 
til:ae representatives for spoc1.tic tuks. In ot.her instances, the national. 
6 
· office shares the salary and expenses of a political. action worker with a state 
PAC. 
Up until May of 1953, PAC headquarters atill had not brought ita 
organisational chart up to date. tven though Murray and Haywood had passed 
from the scene, their names were still listed on the national executive board. .. 
Philip llurray was listed as chairman, but he had been replaced by Walter Heuth • 
long with Mr. Reuther, there are: David J. MacDonald, Secre't.ary-tre",auNr; 
ack Kroll, director, (he replaced Sidney Hil~an upon his death); Joseph 
airne, J. S. Buckmaster, James B. Carey, Joseph Curran, O. A. Knight, Jacob 
Fototsky, Michael Quill, Emil .t\ieve, .Al Hartnett, EmU Mazey .. T. M. McCormick, 
iilliam Pollock, Frank Rosenblum.., Desmond Walder and Carlton Werkau. 
lli Financing 
There are numero1l8 legal requirements covering the financing ot 
political organizations and with allot these the CIO-PAC rigidly compliss. 
Allot the work of CIO-PAC in connection with So federal election is 
inanced by voluntar,r contributions from the members or oro and others who teel 
These contrlou tiOllS a.re recorded by means of receipt. 
om numbered books. 
The locals distribute the books to "'.heir call sot:~rB who receive t.he 
contributions and rUl in the reiJeipts which are in duplicate. The duplicat.e 
is tUnUshed to the contributor while the original .. together with the Inoney, i. 
forwarded through international union cha.nH~ls to tho CI0-PAC. &J.r ot all 
contributi.ons remain within the state in which they were In.a.cie for political 
action work in the state. 
Quarterly reports &:fa tiled with the clerk of the House of Represent-
7 
.. 
atives and such state reports as are required by state 1_ are rUed by the 
appropiate otticials with the proper state orrice. 
Using the buic contribution ot one dollar, this is how the monel' i. 
usedl 
1) State and local PAC - ,O¢J 'l'h1s money goes to the State PAC tor 
. 
local use. Money may be spent tor the toll owing political aetivities' 
a) Salaries 
b) Travel 
. 
c) Printing 
4) Radio 
.) Organization of 
e-l) Wards 
e-2) Neighborhoods 
2) Field Work (State) - .38¢ 
a) Salanes or PAC organizers - 18; 
b) Travel - 17; 
0) Educational. ... 3; 
3) National Office - 12; 
a) Administrative salaries and travel - 2.5; 
b) Rent, light, supplies - 3.3; 
0) Postage, telegrams, telephone - 2.1; 
d) Research - 1.9; 
.) Education - 1.6# 
, Where Your l!Q Dollar ..22.!!, CIO-PAC, Washington, D. C. 
8 
A1ms Of PAC 
---
The 010 believes that they are in politics because the welfare and 
security of all Americans depend on good officials-good. mayora, good. congress-
men, good presidenta--and politics is the prooess by which the,. elect offioials 
PAC report.s the tacts about the isal1e. and the reoorda ot the can-
didates.An ~ple ot this is the PAC', P!!!g?hleta 2t. !!'!! ~ which the PAO 
published to acquaint the people with the tacts ot the day. The f1rat issl1e 
dealt with ItBrettont'loods Is No liystel7~. the author was Joseph Oaer. The 
purpose ot this pamphlet wasl 
To bring to our people a clear and t:ruthful. explanation ot. the moat 
important issues betore the nation, the Clv-PAC has created. PAC's Phamohle 
.2l the Month, wblch will bring to the attention ot the workers of the CIO 
each month the most important current issue before t.he public. Tbis pam-
phlet, the firat in the series, deals with an issue whioh has 6been delib-
erately contused. by some bankers and reactionary congr$semen. 
PAC block workers and shop stewards caIlV'ass their areas. They oarry 
on registration drives and try to get out the vote on election day. The PAC 
appoints a precinct captain in each precinct. nHe is given tiL card file ot all 
union members in his precinct."7 Hi. primary job is to carry on a constant 
campaign to make unregistered residents of his precinct a registered voter. He 
tries to know as many of the people in his precinct as possible. 
The 010 seeks the direct election of the President by popular vote, 
the modernizing of Congress by abolishing the Senate filibuster and by the 
appointment of committee chairmen on the basis of merit. The C10 seeks lair 
6 Joseph Gae~, "Bretton Woods Is No Mystery." PACt. PhemPhlets !L 
the Month, New York, 1944, 1. 
7 Julian Brazelton, y! Guide ~ Political Action, 1944. 56. 
• !registration laws tree of red tape and complicated rules, and works tor free 
and open primaries, equal legislative districts, and adequate p~ tor public 
officials. 
The PAC, as sach, i8 not a political party, but it doe. lean heavily 
toward the Democratic Party. Then ia, to be sure, a very good reason for this. 
The Democratic Party has generally lavored labor in its legislative action. 
This trend goes back many years. The Democratic Party, starting lIi'i.,ll Jefferson, 
opposed the Federalist Party, which, in its own way '''as the party of the r1ch 
~an.n 
However, the elO convention at Chioago on November 22, 19S0, declaredl 
"The Clo-PAC is directed to oontirueti) 'aot on an independent, nonpartisan baai~, 
giving support to the progressive foroes in the two major parties, basing its 
judgment or candidates upon their reoords and plattorma .. ,,8 
The PAC oooperates as brOadly as possible with other labor group., 
farmers, professional men, consumers· • • • and all other citizens of gOod will 
who have the same ideals ot public welfare. "9 
To the CIO, the gailla which labor wins thI'ough collective bargainiI4t 
can be proteoted and extended only through a progressive legislative program 
and political aotion to back it up-local, state and national. Thus labor, in 
its forward movement, once mOre reverted to political action to supplement the 
economic cOll8equences ot our oapitalistic system. 
8 010 Political Action Oommittee Phamphlet • .!U!!!! f!&, Washington 
D. C. J ,3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 
.. 
Protection tor 'the health and Htoty ot .orkers ...... orkmen t 8 oompeneaUc Ia 
. 
max1>mm hours tor WQ!aEIJn and children, industrial safety codes-depend primarily 
on legislative action. 1'he provision of adequate low-ooat ho~sina. usistance 
for the uoompluyeci, 1Iin:.1Jaum wagea, expandec:l eQuoational apport-unities-aU CO 
OOyond the scope or colleotive bllorga1nina into the tu,14 of political action. 
'''en aain.taiIiing steady emplo)'aent. :f'or aU workers and aV'oi<l1ng boou a:n4 busts, 
depends increasingly on the policies ot goyernment. 
To the (;LO the PAC 1s an organisation ot nesh and blood that cannot 
becomprees4td or explained 0" an orgilJl1satlonal ch&rt. It. 18 All organ1zatlon, 
the parts or whicb ue interchMGeable end equally well geared t.o tit, Onf\ with 
the other, to tona the pollUcal orgQI'liaatlon ot the 010. 
Within broad 11m1ta, the tWlOtion ot each of its parts 18 political 
action in its entirety and no p~ ol the orgwaation i8 b.ble to ret\tse a 
part1c,llar tuk on the grounds 1oha' -it,· 8 not rq job ff • What is lost b;r lack ot 
spec1ali~ation ls more t.ban ga1.n8d 1nvenat.illty. '!hat 1s not t.o Sa.:! that P':iC 
doea not han its speciallsts. It i. rather that PAC special.l.'a are required 
to half. abUitoiea oyer and above the1r specialties. 
On.l7 by u1ntainlng tlhia unity of pW"poa. U the CIu-P;~C &ole to 
tulru It. tW'lctlon nth it, small ,Wt. Only thi8 desir8 to aobieve a comon 
ObJectl.e produoe. the enthusiasm and energy that make. taeks more than routine 
&Qc, in the end. sometime. prov1.dea succeS5 when defeat s.eras the probable out ... 
oomo 'us it 80 seUted itL \.he 1948 presidential. election. 
The CIO-PAC claima:l thatregenaration ot the democratic falth i8 tAl.r1'fti 
plaoe in the nation. They reel that it rII.Irj be the result, perhaps, of the 'War 
and at it. oona8q!lent challenges to that faith. Silt lt takes 1ta expreSSion 
u 
(tbe7 claim) t it not ita 1napiration, fram t.he OIO-fAG, trona the feeling or 
11n1on men and women that it 1s not politics t.hat. ia a dirty bue1neas but. some-
times the practitioners of politics. 'rhrou.gh .the.1r anion organiaat.1on, the PAC 
olaima, they oan taelcle and sol". tncbstrUJ. and economic probleuof more than 
ind1vidtlal magnitude and, now, thro.lgh t.heir political oX"Jan1zatlons they are 
learning that application ot the "8 spirit will solve social and political. 
probl.a and that all of theae probl.. haft OOl!Won de;:lOlninatore. 
'l'btls to cru polit1cal aotlometa, the ~r80n who touls the dtmtocratlc 
ll$st by abondoning principles as .. gu.id1ng rille :Lnpolltics. is a pereOIl1fnO is 
touling the whole or the CODltl'll.lOit.,r and the conmro.nlty should be warned against 
him. In f'h1l.ade1phia, tor ~l$t 9 .... inter-party corrllption wu met. by 
tne simple expedient or replacing De.!aocrata who were on the Republioan uch1ne 
payroll with Olo-PAC people who .oarried through the asslgrmellt.at.h&t 'Were made 
on election ~.ulO 
In the tOl"'llUlatlon and application ot this polit.ical oode of fIlO1"als. 
the CIu.-l-'aC t •• 1" U. 18 ountribut111g not only to ita own weltare. whioh 18 
l1udentandable .. bu.t. al,o to the willar. ol the nation u a wbo1e. It 18 replac-
ing the cynicism alld disrespect ,for democrat10 in#tit.utloll8 and prooedures that 
have itl the past. preceded t.he downfall ot de.moeraoy with a healthl det(lrminatiOJ 
to maintain in good repair, that tlerlble syetea ot demQor&l.tic government whioh 
makes t.he beat po."ible oompromiae between liberty and authOr1ty. 
0.2!.t~tional ~'2r~ .2t ~ 
Pvhapa tbe simplest _ani of deacrib1. the opsr<a.t10n of PAC is to 
12 
picture an imaginary congressional district. This is the way the elO describes 
it. This h.fPothetical. district is in an industrial area and there are many 
labor voters who are cO;J.carned with the kind ot representation they have in the 
national congress. They have a llel1 organized PAC and they are actively engage 
in politics. 
Xhe incumbent rep~sent~tive is a person whose voting record indicate 
that he is more concerned with the owners of industry in our hypothetical com-
murdty than with the welfare ot the workers and their families. 
John Smith is a young attorney in tmm. He has held a few political 
offices and has established something ot a record for himsel!. He believes he 
could represent the people of that incumbent and he has definite views on the 
particular issues of the day. He has, therefore, filed as a candidate for Con-
gress. But he knows he l:i. ves in an industrial district and that his chances 
depend to a large extent. upon the degree ot backing he can get tl'om organized 
labor, or so supposes the elO in their thinking. 
John Smith, therefore, calls up one of his friends who is a. local 
union Official.. He tells h1.ll he is going to run for Congress and that he would 
like the active support of the PAC. .His friend tells him to take the matter up 
with the local PAC committee and he gives Smith the name of the chairman. Sm1tl 
and the rAC chairman m.ake atl appointment to tiil.k things over. 
When John Smith and the PAC chairman get together, Smith finds that 
in addition to the chairman there au. tour or five other people present. The,y 
are the screening oommittee and it is their function to make the prel1minar;r 
deoision as to whether Smith warrants their support. 
Smith and the screening committee talk the whole matter over. They 
13 
.. 
discuss at great length Smithts views on current political questions to deter-
mine primarily how well informed Smith i. and how closely their Views coincide. 
There may be differences of opinion between Smith and the screening committee, 
but the main question in the committee's mind is whether Smith and the people 
theY' represent are both going in the same direction. 'rhey are more concerned 
with his general outlook than his specific views on the way in which to solve 
certain problems. 
The committee and Smith may also discuss the ~uestion of' finances, 
the ,other support that Smith has, tJ'le reco:cd he has made in the public office 
he has held, and his prospects of' w1nning. 
Following the tall.c, the steering Q,ommi.ttee makes up .its mind and at 
the next meetine of the Politioal Action Committee they submit their report. 
They have talked to Smith, Btown and Jones, and they believe that John ,l)mith i8 
the man who should be endorsed. He 1s an able man, they say, and his record 
entitles, _im to a ehance at higher oftice. 'l'he PAC concurs in the recommendati ~ 
of' the screening committee and votes an endorsement of John Smith. 
This endorsement is reported to the constituent unions of ,the area 
PAC, to the state PAC and to Clo-PAO in Washington. It is also announced to 
the newspapers. 
Having endorsed John Smith, the area PAC proceeds to back it up. It 
checks the membership files of all unions within the area to see it all members 
and their wives, adtllt children and in-laws are registered to vote. It they ar. 
not registered, machinery is eet in motion t.o get them registered. Caravans 
from workshops to the Registrar's ottice are organized_ Reg1strars are persuad c 
to keep late offiae hours. In some places union members may be deputized &8 
registrars. 
Following the final registration day, the area PAC takes stock and 
lays plans for the coming election day. On0 of the most important jobs is that 
of educating the union membership and others in the community on the issues in-
volved. Housing may be the important problem in the community_ For arguments 
sake, let as suppose that John ..::imith supports federal housing legislation which 
is in tune with the CLO-PAC' s point ot view, while the incumbent believes such 
legislation is an unwarranted intrusion ot the federal government into the 
domain of Pl'iT&te enterprise. 
The stage being set, the PAC will get all the infonnation it can &boo 
housing and aboat the proposed legislation. It may make a survey to determine 
the erleting hou81ngcondi tiona, in the district, the amo~nt ot private housing 
being constru.cted and t.he amount of rental housing available, the scale .ot 
rents being charged, and the possibilities of erecting low cost projects. 
Then it will print and distribute literature on the question_ It may 
make available speakers who can discuss the subject of housing and its various 
aspects. It may purchase radio time tor a discussion on this issue. It will 
get people talking about housing, sllch as th$ pros and cons of public l\>w cost 
housing as opposed to ~rivately financed housing, so that the voters will have 
some informat10n on wtiich to make lip their minds about John ~mith and his 
opponent. 
Along with educational carnpaiCll on the issues a.nd the records ot the 
opposing candidates, the'PAC outlines detailed plans for election day. 
Allot these activities, of course, cost money. The area PAC may 
have some that it has raised in local arfairs. It may also receive some money 
lS 
from the state PAC and trom CHI-PAC. Because J OM Smith is running for federal 
office, all of this maney is trom voluntary contributions in accordance with 
Section 304 at the Taft-Hartley Act. 
The big push comes on election day. Car pools are set u.p to transpor 
poople to the polls and dispatchers mu.t be a~ailable to tell the drivers where 
to go. Mothers "ho cannot leave their homes unattended must be turnished the 
services at baby sitters while they go to the polls. At the polls themselves 
there must be watchers and challengers and atter the polls close, someone must 
watch to make sure that votes in the ballot box are the only ones that are 
counted. 'rhese poll watchers must be ted and the drivers will need tood so 
they can keep going throughout the day. 
. The object of all otthis, or course, is to make su.re that every elig: ... 
ble voter tollows through and ~Qtes. 
And sometime in the early morning the weU')" PAC people will learn 
that John Smith has been elected to Congr.8~8¥be.ll 
11 Statement ot John Alesia, Direotor ot PAC, State ot Illinois, 
personal interview. 
CHAPTER II 
A RISE 1'0 PROMINENCE 
The "reactionary" off-year election ot 1942 led directly to the for-
mation ot the PAC. Particularily annoying to the Clv was the tact that llartin 
Dies was elected. The fir&t year ot the war, with its disapPOintments and 
nilitary reverses, W4l;l the hardest. In the 1942 state and congressional electiCi~ 
~he Democratic Party met with heavy setbaoks. Pro-administration co~re8smen 
~ere defeated by kepublic&l1s in one district atter another, or lost ground in 
the primaries to conservative Democrats. 
A contributing cause of these setbacks at the polls was the movement 
ot almost six million young into the armed forces, with a resultant fall i.r. 
registration Dong those who were most disposed toyote for the party of 
Roosevelt. It was not that the .Repu.blicans made an., impressive ~ains in 
1942, which Hillman (who was later to be the Director of the PAC) observed 
later, but that the progressive element stayed away trom the polls; onlYl 
twanty-eight million actually voted, against some fifty million in 1940. 
President Roosevelt hiaselt wu passiaaately engroaaacl in 1iohe &flairs 
ot war) particularily in the African landing operation scheduled for late in 
that year. His political advisers were somewhat maladroit in managing th;e 194_ 
campaign. For the New York governorship they named John J. Bennett ot Tarmnany 
Hall fame. The price they pa.id was labor staying away from the polls. Instea. 
1 Matthew Josephson, SidneZ Hillman~ 
Garden City, New lork, 1952, 590. 
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or endorsing ODe ot the major party oandidates that year, the American La};)or 
Party of New York State, led bY' the Dubinsky grOtlp, orfered a third candidate 
in Dean Alrange., 
From the 4aninlstration standpoint, the election results were very 
sour; !~. Thomas Dewey was voted into Office by a decisive margin, since the 
ALpts independent candidate merely helped to cut down the Democratic vote. 
That season was one of mental and political depression in the country 
The latione.l War Labor Board set up the "Little Steel !!I formula which tried to 
stabilize wages in July or 1942. This fOl"mula permitted a 15 per cent increas 
in wages, based on Official estimates of the rise in the cost of liviner from 
Janllary 1 .. l)lLl to ~y 1 .. 1942. Labor showed its dissatisfaction OVer the 
"Little Steel» formula since it did not include the stabilization or prices. 
'I'heretore, the government pledged itself to combat inflation and stabilize 
prices under the President's directive ot April 21, 1~~2.2 
In the various war agencies, auch as the War Manpower Commie-sion, the 
OPA and W.PB, AFt and CIO representativEls sat as member's ot "advisory 90mmittee 
Green and Murray also enjoyed an advisory capacity in the Economic otabil:Lzati 
Board under James F. Byrnes, who had become Roosevelt t s second-in-comma.nd on 
the ciQillan tront. Despite all this, there was really no direct participatio 
at top levels ot government by representatives ot organized labor after t:Ulm.i! 
had lett Washington because ot his 3ttpposed illness in May of 1942. Spokesmen 
of tI~ National Association ot Manufacturers successfally opposed the intra-
du.ction ot joint labor-management committees in plante deV'oted to the producti 
2 Ibid., 592. 
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of 'War materials aa "revolution;ary experimenta",t.ha Mad for which, had not 
. 
yet a.ris~:m. But st111, priG •• Tlere rlsiOi at a faster rate than control. caul il 
cope w1th them. '!'he average wage of third of the nation' a fami11es W&S only 
fl,$OQ a year 1n 1942, despite high wa,.s 1n same rielda.) 
All of this cau.sed Ilnrest. But these were not tho only ca.us •• tor 
unrest. One consequence or t.be congressional campaign ot 1942 Wu.s the electto ~ 
ot enough ant1-1abor-minded members to _sure the p&ssqeof the Smit.h.....co1'\'Nl11 
8ill, called the iiar Labor Disputes, Act, over lTesident liooseve1t t 8 veto in tb 
late spring of 194.). 
the act contained ODe interesting prov1aion which rest~1cted the pay-
ment of money contribu.t1oM to politlcaJ. parties by labor organisations in 
iederal elections. 
11 Winter ot 1942 and spring of 1943, the younger element in the 010 
showed muoh ooncern at the so called New Deal.· s s.tb~cks and serioual.7 dis-
cus.ed measures to help Boosevelt. fhe Smltb-Gonn~ ~ct gave point to their 
discussion. At the time ot it.. pusage by Co~ress. oertain emissaries came 
to· Philip Marray with the propoNl that i-J.llnlan' s "arieel talents Of pressed 
into Hme. again in the polit.ical field. ~anwh11... others disoreetly 
approac..~ed. Hillman with the .ame idea. 
He himself had been salUlg that the 1942 defeats showed that labar 
lllUst make eftorts to mobU1te the country' • 'tOters durirlg the 'War period.4 
j Ibid. 
-
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Political action 'Was not something new to :Hillman. He had been a 
political work horse for many years. Within a tew days after President llurray 
of the ero had chosen him, Hillman organized a meeting of 127 Eastern labor 
leaders who were associated not only with the cro, but with various AFL and 
railway unions, and several state and city labor councils. l'here wu also the 
strong hope of forming a united front with the A1"'L through .. new political 
league, BUlman presided at this meeting, whicb. was held in Philadelphia on 
July' 11, 1943. 
Following a fllll and frank discussion of the proposed program of the 
Political Action Committee, a public announcement was made or its formation. 
Its declared purpose was not only to mobilize the millions of the CIO's cohort 
for active participation in state and national electiOns, but also church and 
women's groups as well as farmers, consumers and ffoommunity organizations" 
throughout the country. 
A statement of policy worked out at this gathering was issued by 
Hillman and reflected the highly practical spirit with 'Which the labor men 
approached their task. He stated that the country faced a political crisis. 
The election of many isolationists and conservative congressmen in November ot 
1942 was a dire warning of what :night happen in the presidential contest of 
1944. After all, the 010 had grown in an atmosphere of administrative fav-or-
itism, and Hillman, along with his followers, did not wish to see this end. 
He stated: 
We are opposed to the org&1.ization ot a third party at this time be-
cause it would divide the forces of the progressives throughout the nation 
We are here to mobilize our power for political action naw--not to wait 
20 
until a few months before the elections of 1944.' 
The purpose of the committee. C10 President Philip MulTay (now deceas ( 
reported to the CII.) convention on !Jovember >. 1943, wast.o ·conduct a broad 
and intensive program ot education for the purpose of mobilizing the tive milli t 
members ot the CIO and enlisting the active support. ot all other trade unions, 
AlL, railroad brotherhoods and unaffil~hted tor effective labor action on the 
political front. n6 
It was defilllltely not, the report ot President. i4u.rray said, the polic. 
of the CIO to organize a third party. but ra~her to abstain tram and discOIlrage 
any move in that direction.. 'rhe, pr1.ma.ry political. task was to weld the unity 
of all workers, farmers, and other progressives behind candidates, regardles8 
of party affiliations, who supported the war program of the commander-in-chief 
and enlightened domes tie and foreign policies. 7 
Hillma~ UeJectf ThirdP!r\l £!!h 
Since the days of LaFOllette's Progressive Party movement in 1924, 
Hillman had often thought about the problem ot building a ~d party for labor 
But in many sections ot the cOWltry, state primary laws made it well-nigh im-
possible to organize a real third party. Moreover, Hillman believed that labor II 
"invGstl'llent ll in itoosevelt and his political apparatus was worth while and that 
a friendly alli~lce with the Roosevelt Administration represented the best w., 
in which the interests of labor could be aciv."nced in the immediate sense. As 
5 !!!!£!:! l'imes, July 12, 1943. 
6 .Q12 Convention Proceedings, 1943, 201. 
7 ~., 204 
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early as Sep~ember 1943, he had sent up a few trial balloons in favor ot a 
fourth term for ltoosevelt, declaring that ~he GIO would support. the wartime 
President if he ran again. 8 
To be sure, Hillman had the backing ot President Murray, in ~h18 
endeavor, l"Pf,'tt was Murray'S plan ~o have the industrial unions back Rooseve11 
wllile demanding new concessions fr01l1 governmental agencies. 
"But this week, While the CIO Political Action Comnittee handed 11008-
evelt what appeared to be a blank check, CIO's executive board demanded that 
the President lay it on the line and make some drastic changes in his agencies' 
handling of labor attairs. n9 
But not all labor leaderS looked through the same rose colored glass-
es. Critics of vIO's President, Philip Murray--notably John L. Lewis--n ••• 
have charges that in pledging the labor vote to President Roosevelt, he had 
turned his back on colleotive bargaining. It has been said that he has for-
gotten the ancient union axiom 1 'Oet for what you give. t .. 10 
Hillman's improvisations took the form of a nationwide politioal 
fieague which, while representing .labor primarily, was not to be an independent 
Inational political. party, but was still to be alltonomous. 1'hat is, it was to 
~unotion as full partner in a coalition, mainly with the Roosevelt Democrats, 
~ut it would also lend its strength to progressive Republican candidates for 
Pongress. This was the over-all plan and represented a sort of half way stage 
8 Detroit Fret Press, September 14, 1943. 
9 Business~, June 24, 1944, ~. 
10 Ibid. 
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between a third partJ tor labor and an auxiliary- ot the old professional partie • 
In its details, in its development of a "grass root.s" organization atfiliated 
with network of thou.sands of eIO looal Ilnion offices dotting the map ot the 
United Sta.tes, the pil.e reflected Hillman's highly imaginative and inventive 
spirit. The PAC, he insiated, was' going to pay its own way. Large sums ot 
money 'Would be needed. In the preliminary conferences with the ero exeeu.tivea, 
he asked that seven of the biggest unions donate at least one hundred thousand 
dollars ea.ch to the PAC treasury. 
The CIO-PAC was bei~ organized to see to it that the voice of labor 
and the common man was heard in the nation's political cOMcila and in the 
determination of the peace and post-war plans. Hillman was tor national econom 
ic planning in the interests of "tu.ll employment" after the war. In hia tight-
1ng speech keynoting the PAC program" he moved to a position at the head ot 
labor's adv8n.ce guard, one that he had held tor long years before. We were at 
the crossroads of history. ~e up your minds," he cried, "that we are either 
going to get a better world or we are going to be thrown backward. We will not 
stand still' • • • Malee 1944 a year of decision for the common man here and 
everywhere_flU 
The u.pshot of this enthusiastic gathering was that by vote of the 
delegates, Hillman got the seven hu.ndred thousand dOllars promised for the PAC. 
Not all the CIO chieftains were really eager to part with all that money, but 
Hillman was a hard man to stop when it came to fund raising. As news of this 
got arou.nd to the professional politicans in both parties, it forced them to 
11 Q!Q Convention Proceedipss, 194.3, 249. 
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realize tlw.t here was something to be dealt with. The newspapers, magnifying 
Hillman's political "war chest tt about tenfold, reported that he was being armed 
with a "slush" fund of seven million dollars. 
HUlman Gains Control 2! !h!. American Labor Part.l 
from the start of the Political Aotion Committee, Hillman had his eye 
on the New York State's P.merican Labor Party as a pivotal local organization 
that conformed well into the frame ot his larger plan. Thrown together hastily 
tor the oampaign ot 1936, the ALP had lived a fairly troubled life since then, 
while trying to gather in the independent, labor I and leftwing voters who balk-
ed at the crooked Tammany tickets. 
David Dubinsky :had "Run Away" from the CIO, as Philip Murray had put 
it, and brought the ILGVm back into the fold ot the AFL. His now powerful 
union competed with BUlmanIs Amalgamated Clothing Workers for local political 
influence in New York, and sometimes i.n Washington. Old rivalries and not a 
tew jurisdictional quarrels lay at the bottom of the conflict between the two 
Wlions at this period. Yet in July, 1943, Hillman had gone 1',0 Dubinsky and to 
his lleutenan1'" Alex Rose, who was in charge of the ALP's State E.xecu1',iV'e Com-
mittee, to urge that they combine torces. What he had proposed specifically 
was that the ALP's controlling state comm1tte~ be reorganized to permit a 
fairer representation of the different 010 and AFL groups, thus encouraging 
uni ty between the right and left •• wing tactions and ensuring victory for the N_ 
Deal in the event of a close election in New York. His proposal, however. was 
promptly rejected by Dubinsky. 
But Hillman hAd not come as a mendicant in this case. Through his 
own influence that could reach tens ot thousands 0:.' voters who were J~gamate 
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Wlion members and their asisters and. their cousins and their uncles and their 
aunts,· he was, it is stated by some writers, in a position to bring about a 
decided shift in the composition of the ALP's state committee. This had to 
m.ean just one thing. 'llhat these people would vote the way he wanted them, 
which in this author's estimation was not the case. At any rate Hillman soon 
began to use public pressure, in the form. of an open letter to the newspapers 
which stated' 
My proposal, in briel, is that all the trade Illlionists in this state, 
cro, AFt, Rail'Way Brotherhoods and unaffiliated unions be invited to 
affiliate themselves with the. party /J.1il and to pay to ita per capita 
tax based on their membership in the state • .. ... All state and count,. 
oommittees will be made u.p primarily ot representatives of the participat-
ing unions, with a compofition tairly representative of the numberical. 
strength ot such unions. ~ 
Hill.man's plan resembled roughly that under which British labor llmoll 
were appOrtioned representations in the British Labor Party. It appealed to 
him as fair and democratic. Mr. Dubinsky and .Mr. Rose assailed his proposal, 
however, on grounds set torth in vehement polemiC articles, published in the 
~\~ts newspaper, Justice and in the !!! Leaderl 
I~ would result in placing anotoriou~· pro-Communists in control ot 
the ALP. Hillman himself is not .. Communist, yet for the sake of some 
momentU7 advantage, he cooU,. proposed to take over the American Labor 
Party by combining with the alleged Communists, who would doubtless wreck 
the organization when it suited the party line to do so.13 
thus with this cleavage, there now existed three parties to vie tor 
New Yorkts massive vote in the electoral college, the American Labor Party 
covering abOtlt 10 to 15 per cent of the state's voters, with the two older 
12 !!!. ~ Times, August le, 1943. 
13 New Leader. September 4, 1943. 
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parties in .fairly eVten 'ba1c.lnce, 07:~ to Mr. De'liey'lS great strength Ilpstute. 
11d.s proopt£d spectllatlon that if the I\LP were torn by dissension, and if the 
010 left-wing \lIUOn members 'Were discouraged from making the {''lost intense error s 
tor the dLP election canvass~s seemed inevitable under the leadership ot Hill 
man's opponents-then the state l:light well b~ lost to the Republicans in Ho-
vember o.r that year. 
Meanwhile, in the Hearstpr~ss, ~'#e8tbrook Pegler revived the old 
c.mard of the iwalgamated union' s. all~ged connections with racketeers. The 
a..-ticle stated that at tha.t time Louis 1epke languished in a Federal peniten-
tiary_ ~festbrook Pegler asserted that Governor Dewey had been damanding that 
Lapka be turned over to the jurisdiction at the New 10rk State Authorities for 
punishment but that Jlo.ttorney General Francis Diddle had refused this request 
at the order or President .Hoosevelt himself. This, according to lb.-. Pegler, 
was dene in erder to. protect ~oosevelt's friends in the labor. movement. 
Pegler then added that Gover-nor Dewey's eagerness to. have Lepke in 
his hands and hold him in terror of the death chair was inspired less by fear 
that justice might. not be done than by the desire to induce Lapka to "sing" 
a:.::out his dealings with both Dubinsky and HUlman.14 
Following the intervention of' Mr. P~ler .. Representative Martin Dies 
ot Texas.. chairman at the House Un-Ji..marican Activities ComrrJ.ttee, entered the 
scene. On January 26, 1944 .. he announced that the PAC, its chairman and offi-
cers were u.nder thorough investigation and would soon be called to Vi ashington 
to test1f'y before his committee.1S 
Atter lome days had passed, du.dng which he de1iberat.ed over the 
problem raised by Dies, Hillman made a statement to the press deolaring that 
the Ull-IAmerican Actilfities Committee had no legal authOrity wha.tsoever te in-
"Vestiga:t.e the PAC or to oall him for a hearing before it. Hia detiance of the 
powerful Dles, it was said at the time, won him great credit in the eyes of 
New Yorkers, many of whom theroughly disliked the congressman from Texas. 
Hillman's actions were flnallY capped offwlth t.he CIO Pollt.ioal Action C~ 
mit tee , s retusal to give IlP their recorda to the Dies Comm1ttee.16 
:By' mid...January or 191&4, the tight with Rose was going very well fer 
the HUlman taction. when BUddellly Hillman came ferward with a proposal of a 
compromise plan which would otfer assu:rance that neither the lett- nor the 
right-wing groups would oontrol the ALP's state executi"Ve committee. At a con-
terence with Alex ROse on January 20, att.end.ed. also by other CIO and AIL repre-
sentati"Ves, Hillman proposed that • 
• • • a joint slate ofcand1dates Qor the state comm:1tteeJ be 
mutually agreed Ilpon. I sllggest that ••• all t.rade Ilnions desiring to 
partioipate in t.he work: or the ALP should be entitled to representation 
in the party leadership in proporlion to their membership, with adequate 
proviSion for representat.1on of t.he liberal and progressive forces who ~4 
without trade-unioll affiliation and who support the program of the ALP.17 
Atter an exchange of letters between Hillman and Rose, published in 
the newspapers on January 22nd. and Ja.maTy 2,St.h., efforts at an accommodat.ion 
were finally abandoned by Hillman and his associates. Their opponents, Hill-
1,S !!!!2£!. Times, JQnuary 27, 194!h 
16 Commercial.!!!9 Financial Chron1cal, February 24, 1944, 816. 
17 New lork Times. Janua:r)" 21, 1944. 
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man said, showed a desire only to perpetu.ate their "narrow leadership" at all 
costs and were determined to deny any system ot fair representation to other 
groups. Therefore, he proposed to reorganize the ALP without the a:1d of ill'. 
Rose at al.18 
In the final week ot March ot 1944, demonstrations were organised 
iby the Hillman faction, while the war of words and pamphlets rose to its 
hottest pitch<t On the next day, a huge turnout of more than eighty thousand 
went to the prim.~ie8 and registered a thu.mping victory for the Hillman slate 
by a three to two margin.. The :r1ght-wing faction, still spurning all offers 
of conciliation, seceded to form the n_American Liberal Party, under now 
auspices, whUe Hillman, natural1,. l'I'U elected state chairman· of the American 
Labar Party. 
The Deteat .2! ~H Die, 
By 1944, the American ~ople were feelinimany of the discomtorts 
a.ttendant upon by a great war in modern times. Wages were frozen,. while great 
stores of consumer goods were pusing into the black market. Millions ot work-
ers saw their earnings fixed by agreements written for them in a room in Wash-
ington under the procedures of the powerful National lhAl' Labor Board, an 
arrangement scarcely calculated to inspire them. with a sense of participation 
in their own affair.·. To them, it was Ilbigh finance, If something they could 
not possibly hope to u.nderstand. Practical observers of the political scene 
reported that they felt themselves alienated fran the Roosevelt Administration 
18 .!2!sl.,' ebruary 9, 1944. 
and were ot a good mind to stay away trom the polls.19 
Hillman particularly.. it must be admitted, was inst.l't.UJlental in mak-
ing labor a somewhat coherent, though not too highly ettective toree in the 
political field; tor he did give same sort of a voice to the common people who 
were dOing most of the producing and tighting. Be raised issl1es which the 
tormer New Dealers, absorbed in mUitar,r and au.pply problems, 'Were neglecting. 
What kind ot peace would we have atter the fight.ing wu over? Would there be 
full employment and security att.er the war? Above all, the PAC pounced upon 
the issue ot the soldiers' ballot which the Repu.bUca.n-D1x1e bloc in Congre88 
had. obstruoted tor a till'lfh Soon the widespread discu8sion of human aftairs 
inspired by the distribution of millions ot bright. little pamphlets by the PAC 
began to make itself telt ill all parts of the countl'T •. 
This PAC action in the political cage seemed different though. 
PoUtieal organizations set up by labor in the past had sometimes 
been rather narrow in their objectives, which were usually limited to 
trade-wdon demands not or 1mm.ediate interest to citizens outside the 
labor movement. Now, as PhUip Murray himself declared, a nationwide 
organization was being set up not only to protect the political rights 
ot the returning soldier and the workingman, but also "the rights ot 
the tarmer, the small businessman, and the so-called common man. M20 
from the start, the PAC JI1ade .. broad appeal to many different white-
collar, farmer, and professional. groups. Billman said. "We are calling for a 
chief Executive and a Congress committed to tull utilization of our economic 
resources. This 1,8 not a 'labor program.,·21 
19 H. Fl1Uer ... J!! ReRS!?lic, January 24 .. 1944. 
20 Joseph Gaer, !!:! first BoW' New York, 1944, 60-61. 
21 Chicago Daily News, July 17 .. 1944. 
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Regional ottices tor the PAC were located in large cities such as 
Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. One 
dred and thirty-five persons were e;llployed. tull time ,at the national head-
uarters in New York (located at 205 lW1st 42nd i:Jtreet), Ul'lcHtr the direction 
£ Assistant Chaiman Calvin B. Baldwin, who joined. the Pj\C in November ot 1943 
dwin, a native ot Virginia, had served WlGer Henry Wallace in the Depart;ment 
r Agricultu.re and later, trom 1940 to 1943, as head ot the Farm Security 
dministration. Elaldwin also worked in cloae lia1son with seventy-f':1. ve full 
ime employees of' t.b.e PAC at the different regional of rices around. the country. 
These men and women in the tield, 10 t.urn, were in C10S8 tou.ch with local. union 
roups and other organizations arrUiated with the PAC. As the PAC got under 
ay, tllEtre were many mocking comments in the press to the effect that it might 
do m.ore ham than good. to the CJUSe it hoped to serve. 
Ka.n;y mamba betore the primary elections were to take place in the 
outhern states, CIO low anions and their officers, in contact with the PAC'. 
egio1l8.l and national headquarter" had begun to canvass all their turl.on mem-
bers and urge them to register and vote. "Every wor'"er a. votf)r- was the slogan 
~ ~ 
In Martin Dies' own district infexu (Jefferson Cow:rt;y), where the poll tax 
severly restrioted voting" Ilsuall;y to about 10 per cent ot the population, 
thousands. ot shipyard and. oilfield worleen in the towns ot Port Arthur and 
Beaumont were rapidl;y lined up to pq' their poll tax and register tor the 
primaries. 
No sooner did Mr. Dies hear of this than he began his attack on the 
PAC in a torrential. speech before the House on January 26, 1944. l:fe had at 
t'bat time an enormous influenoe in Oongress, most of whose members stood in 
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dread of his possible attacks on their "Nileric.an18l11. If Now he w&rrled his fellow 
congressmen that "gigantic slush .rands Ii were being raised by the CIO to defeat 
them. A few weeks later, agents of the Un-.American Activities Committee ap-
peared in New York and sought permission ot the banks, used as depositories by 
the PAC, to examine the new organiutionts records and expenditare&h This 
step was taken at the height of Hi,llmants struggle tor control of the ALP in 
i'ebruary of that year.22 
The Dies committee 1'!U armed with all the &1thority of Congress. 
Roosevelt himself had failed to terminate ita c",rE:~r. The PAC did not know 
wm.t to do. Some advisers urged Hillman to permit the PAC books to be examined 
while others argued strongly that the Un-American Acti nties Committee had no 
legal. authority whatsoever to e.lUiWine the PAC. There were, however, other 
standing coWnittees ofCongresa empowered to 1nvestiga:te posslble malpractice 
in election campaig'ns before whom the PAC could more properly appear. At 
length, Hillman resolved to Ufight back at Dies" and try to make the affair a 
popular issue. 
On February 24, 1944, in a staternent to the press, Hillman announced 
that he had given orders denying access to the PA.Cts bank accounts by the agent 
of Dies, adding: 
U:r. Dies has no right to any of our records. The PAC ••• will re-
tuso ~ demands he may make on it for records, files, documents, or 
materials , • •• It is high ~e that someone challenged Hartin Dies t 
abuses of COllgre.sional power. J 
22 New York Times, February- 14, 1944. 
--
23 Comme_i'lJ. and Financial Cbron1cal, February 24, 1944, 816. 
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The Polit.ical Action Committee .. he held, was an "eduoational move-
. 
~nt" charactE'rued by a IIprofo'J.nd .Americanism. U Far from advocating any 
~ubversive ideas, he argued that: 
• .. • it is mobilizing millions Qt Americans to do their dutY' as 
American citizens at the polls. It is a perversion of reason and common 
sense to hold that it is Un-American or subversi va to ask these millions 
of America~ citizens to give their support to a program of politioal 
education. 24 
&'t most were not taken in when Hillman declared that the PAG 11&8 an 
~ducational program as such. HUlman· s old antagonist in Congress, Mr. Howard 
pmith, had also threatened to take action against the PAC, charging that it had 
[violated the Smi th-Connally Act in ~xpellding union flmds tor election purposes 
~d should be cited before a Federal Grand Jury. To forestall this, Hillman 
~nd his lawyers 'JIent to Attorney General Biddle and this time voluntarilY' 
~ubm1.tted the PACt s records tor examination by FBI agents. On March 4, 1944, 
",t was reported that the PAC would be "cleared." Under existing law, any labor 
prganization could legally expend money in "educating*' people on political 
ssues or in persu.a.ding them to register and vote in the primaries. In this 
~aseJ Biddle's :report indicated, fundS had not been paid out to politioians or 
heir agents, but only tor pamphlets and lectures. Once the candidates were 
tlominated by their parties, however, d1.t"ferent meaS\~re8 would be called for and 
~he labor unions WQlld ~Ye to step out of the picture. But the PAC had a 
Beans of "getting around!' this issue which will be explained later on .. 
Within the Un-American J~ctivities Committee of Congress, there was now 
rtUch dissension between Dies and a minority group who held that he had not been 
24 Ibid. 
-
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authorized to move against the Political Action Committee. Nevertheless, be 
rushed forth 1fi th a large 215 page report on the PAC which charged that Sidney 
Hillman aspired "to become the Red Chief- of America in place of ¥r. Earl 
Is rowder. Hillman, the report admitted, had been "actively and effectively" 
anti...cammunist" in the past, but now, it was alleged, he was baUding up the 
CIo-PAC by entering into a coalition. with the Communist. 25 
PAC was now to defeat Dies at aqy cost. In his congressional distric , 
embracing Orange and BeaWllont, registra.tion had risen 30 per cent higher than 
eITer }mown before in tha.t region. In a thousand precincts, local union officel'l 
who acted as field representatives for the PAC recorded exactly how manr union 
members had voted in the last election, how many had moved from their homes, 
and how many held residence permitting them to register. Thus in Jefferson 
County, Texas, the registration of the union workers in the new war industries 
reached figures astonishing to hack po1iticiane. 
In May came news that seemed mira.culous beyond belief to the PAC. 
Mr. Martin Dies had withdrawn from the Democratic primary contest for renomi-
nation in his old district, admitting openly that he had done this because ot 
the jump in registration stimulated by the PAC. It showed, he said, that "the 
CIO had captured control of the Jetferson Count,., Texas, Democratic Convention. ~~ 
In qu.ick succession, Representative Joe Starnes of Alabama. and John Co:rt.el1o of 
California, two other members of the Un.Am.erican Activities Committee, were 
-
25 ".After Extracts from the Report of the House Un~erican ActlvitiEu 
Committee on the PAC," !!:! .!.2!:! Journa.l-American, .March. 2:), 1944. 
26 .!!! ~ Times, Yay 19, 1944. 
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also deteated in their primary election contests • 
. 
Roosevel~ Accepts !h!. f!Q 
Earlier, there had been some !U.mors in high Democratic PartY' circles 
that the PAC was "too hot," that SidneY' Hillman was stirring up too many 
factional. teuds which were likely to injure the chances or the ruling partY' in 
the coming elections, and that President Roosevelt would have to speak to Sid-
ney Hillman about this. The ailing Roosevelt also was in a pessimistic humor 
at various periods during 1944, espeoially when a confidential poll made bl' the 
Democratic Party showed that he was losing favor with Catholic voters. 
But by early June, when Hillman came to see him at the White House, 
the President had begun to cheer up and there was no more talk of "toning down" 
the PAC. This young organization was already showing some strength in strate-
gic areas such as OhiO" Ulinois, and Oalifornia.. The knockout ot Congressman 
Dies was a teat whose importance the potent Roosevelt himsel.f' fully apprecia.ted 
Hillman's position was now wholly different from that of' 1942, when he h ... d been 
unceremoniously ushered out of' the war-production organization. It was strong 
enough tor him to be able to "change the President's mind on 00cas10n."21 
Presumably what the two men talked a.bout very confidentially at. this 
meeting on June' 9, 1944, was the selection ot a running mate tor Roosevelt in 
the approaching campaign for a tOtlrth term. It was a. subject ot enormous in-
terest, for the President had been very ill recently. 
for generationJJ in this oountry, pres1dent-making has been something 
like the "sport ot kings." But u8ually it has been the kir.'.(;s of banking a.nd 
~vJ\STO~~ 
V ~~ 
27 New York Times, July 31, 1944. ( LOyo LA 
- - ~ UN1VER..5...l.1:Y 
dustrywho enter the race to put their tavo~ite contender in the White House, 
var trade unionists or laborites. 
But public opinion polls in 1944 showed a 67 per cent majority of 
interviewed favoring additional cnrbs upon labor and its activities, 
ld newspaper com~ent was becoming increasingly hostl1e. 28 
The Piie was attacked as radical, !In-American and dominated b7 the 
ommunists who in this wartime caln.psign were strongly supporting hoosevelts 
e-election. A long report by the Dies Committee on Un-American i'ictivities 
oncluded with the charge that the ~ole movement was Us subversive Communist 
ampaign to subvert the Congress of the United States to its totalitarian 
rogram. " The president of the Union Pacific RaUway solemnly warned that the 
:A.G was fla pernicious innovation that has litert!\lly snaked its way into Amer-
can politics," While Governor Bricker of Ohio declared that it was seeking 
'to dominate our government nth radical and communistic schemes. «29 
PAC Backs Wallace 
-
In July 1944, as preparations were being made tor the opening ot the 
mocratic National Convention at Chicago, Sidney Hillma.n and Philip Uurr&3' 
ivec! on the scene with a. large and imposing party repres~"lting the cro, and 
pened headquarters of their own at the Hotel Sherman. The OrO-PAC was reported 
o have some two hundred Democratic Party delegates in its pocket--though this 
as greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, Hillman and Murray seemed determined 
hat the spokesmen of organised labor should take a hand in the president-
28 Foster Rbea nIlles, Labor !a America, New York, 1949, 349. 
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~aking ot that season, or rather the vice-president-making--which proved to be 
Ithe same thing. 
The war in!iurope was in its clilJlactic phase, tor the invt.sion ot 
~rance had been recently launched, namely, on June 6, 1944. But who cou.ld tell 
haw soon the end would came? Roosevelt, with much less hesitation than 1n 1940, 
~ad resolved to run again tor the pre:::idency and thus see the war through. None 
lin his party opposed hi-'ll. The third-term taboo had already been broken, and 
many persons and organizations (including the Amalgamated at its May 1944 
convention) had ta'70red ttdratting" «oosevelt oncf:' more. 
Bu t those who saw the President in the winter ot 1943 and spring ot 
il944, were quite shocked at his changed a:t')pearance.. It was not known to the 
public that in roid-Apr,il, he had gone to rest at Bernard M. Baruch's estate in 
$Otlth Carolina tor two weeks during which he fllookGd like a case of walking 
pheumonia, tf and had been too weak and ill to return to Washington until to'..u-
weeks had passed.30 Roosevelt's intimates and the party leaders were aware 
~hat he might well die in otfice duri:l!; his tourth ter:n. This led to some 
Irerocious intriguing among the Democrats interested in the vice-presidential 
~hoieel all of it very distressing to the wear-.f President. 
Mr. Baruch, an old hand at inside politics, ueed ever-.r opportu."lity 
fVhile the President eonvalaseed, to urge the cause of his old political alter 
ego, James F. Byrnes, former Senator from. South Oarolina. and Supreme Court 
~!lst1ce, then serving as Direetor of War Mobilization. Vice-President Henr,y 
l!allace (at the time on a mission to China) should llormally have been re-
.30 E. J. 'lynn, You t re .!!!! B5!!!, NnYork:, 1947, 178-179. 
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nominated, for he was supposed to hold great appeal for millions of liberal and 
labor voters. But powerful opposition to him had arisen among the Democratic 
Party's big city bosses, such as Edward J! Flynn of New York, Edward Kelly ot 
Chicago, Frank Hague of Jersey City, and Robert Hannagan ot St •. Louis, the 
Democr""tic national chairman. 'fhe ')outhern politicians also were opposed to 
allace, and Roosevelt. was "inundated" with advice from anti-Wallace Democrats 
that the incumbent Vice-President, 1.f renominated, would !lOOrt. the ticket" in 
a close election.31 
Hillman strongly Objected to the Byrnes movement. This writer wonder 
if this might not have stemmed trom the tact that Hillman had been unceremoni-
ously ushered out ot the war-production organization in 111 ich Byrne.s had ext en ... 
sive influence. 
It was at this period, in an oft-the-record visit with Roosevelt on 
1944, that Hillman learned that the names ot others being daf1nitely 
considered tor the vice-presidency included Supreme Court Justice William O. 
glas, Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, and Senator ~ry S. Trumanot 
·iissouri. .t'hilip Murray strongly favored the renom1na tion ot Wa.Jiace. Truman, 
on the other hand, in new ot the sectional cont'licts within the Democratic 
Party, was a more conciliatory figur'e coming as he did from a "bordertf state, 
,r 
nd having an excellent record with regard to New Deal and labor legislation. 
While in the OPM in 1941, HUlman bad subjected to some searching 
inquires on the part ot the Trl.UlUUl committee. But a former associate ot HU1-
'8, Max Lowenthal, once an attorney for the Amalgamated, had been closely 
31 Washigp;op Time .... Herald. January 22, 1945. 
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associated with Truman for years as counGel to a Senate 8u.bconunit.tee investi-
gating railroad finances, and knew him well. According to Jonathan Daniel' 8 
accou.nt, Lownethal, in the spring of 1944, strongly urged Harry Truman to 
accept the vice-presidential nomination if it were oltered to him.32 
Although Lowenthal himself did not go to see Hillman at thi8 time, his favor-
able appraisal of Mr. Tru.man certainly reached the cha1r.rJan ot the PAC. 
StUl, the PAC stressed the large part that it would play in the 
approaching campaign and pointed out that it had given the strongest 8."1dorse-
ment to Henry Wallace for Vice-President. Hillman therefore, would give h1m 
full support as the CIO' s first choice. TJihat worried him most .as the dater-
• 
mio.ation ot the u!jig Four" Democratic city boases, Flynn, Hague, 'ally and 
Crump, to block: Wallace. but in spite ot this, plus the fact that it was 
rumored that W'allace had known disposition tor mystical religious cults, the 
C.ro-PAC continued in ita backing tor the Vice-President till the end. 
By July 10, 1944, the situation (as tar aa it can be pieced together 
trom the incanplete and conflicting recollections of all parties concerned) was 
as follows' Roosevelt had .::.d:ward. J. Flynn's report trom the field indicting 
that Wallace was unwanted by the Democratic Party boaaesJ be had meanwhile 
committed himself" in some mea8Ul"e, to sponsoring Byrnes, bat had noted the 
vigorou.s objections of Hillman ou behalf of the CIO and of Negro leaders and 
Ca.tholics as well J and tinal.ly he had asked Flynn. to get a ~oup otthe·Dem-
ocra.tic Party bosses to,ether and "inject Truman into the picture" as the best 
possible alternative to B;ym.u. On the evening ot July 11, 1944, a committee 
32 J. Daniels, The Man !!:.s Independence, New York, 1950, 231. 
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composed of Flynn, Hannegan, Kelly, George Allen, and Franlc Walker came to din-
. 
ner at the White House and discussed the whole alfair with Roosevelt. Justice 
William O. Douglas was mentioned as a possibUity by the President, though 
withou.t evoking enthusiasm. In the end, Roosevelt is said to have handed Han-
ne~an a little pencUed note sayingt "Bob, I think Truman is the right man. tf33 
On the day before this (July 10, 1944), Henry Wallace had at last re-
turned from his mission to Ohina and closeted h1m8elf with the President tor 
two hours. The next day they had another long session, during whioh Wallace 
asked tor Roosevelt's support for his nOmination, saying he would not withdraw 
fram the race unless Roosevelt wanted him to. The President then expressed 
doubts about Wallace's chances for success, but offered his friendly support. 
He went so tar as to promise to write a letter to the permanent chairman of the 
Democratic convention, stating that he would vote for Wallace as V'ic .... Pre.ident 
1£ be were a delegate to the convention.34 
Two days later, ¥Jal1aoe was back again at the White House, and Roose-
velt is said to have written the letter for him on that occasion in the terms 
(more or less) that Wallace de.ire~ 
The Wallace supporters now showed increasing confidence, which was 
reflected in the newspapers on July 13, 1944. Hillman and Murray, who were at 
a press conference that ~ 1n WaShington, declared they ware standing firm tor 
Wallace. 'When Hillman was asked 1£ he had talked with the President. about 
Wallace's candidacy, he said slyly: "1 'WOuld say no) but 1£ I had, I would 
33 Daniela,!e!.!!B!.!:2! Independence I 240. 
34 Washington Times-Herald, January 22, 1945. 
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stUl say no." 
HUlman and Murray both stated. "We have no second choice.,,3> 
Truman Nominated 
But Billman did talk with Roosevelt the next day, July 14, 1944, 
about who would be nominated for the vice-presidency, according to Arthur 
Krook.36 What HUlman was most worried about was the effort to nominate Byrnes 
against whioh he entered the most vebement objections. But now he gathered 
that the President had come to the co.'lClusion that Truman was the man 'Who 'WOuld 
"least hurt the ticket." True, ioosevelt had written a rather lukewarm letter 
in support of Henry Wallaoe, which he showed HUlman. But when Hillman went to 
the ''hite House on July 14, he found that the President on tha.t day had written 
stUl another letter, this time to Robert Hannegan, national cha.irman of the 
Demooratic Party and 800n to be Postmaster General and owner of the St. Louis 
Cardinals baseball team, in which he stated with much more positiveness that 
"Truman and Douglas" would also be acceptable as his running mates. The 
President's secretary, Grace Tul11. has related that originally Douglas' name 
preceded Truman's, bu t that Mr. .Hannagan had the order reversed with Roosevelt's 
approval to favor his triend from the "home-town state" of Missouri. 
At this point, when the Democratic Party bosses were buzzing around 
the White House and the choice was really being made, Hillman reached a clear 
understanding with Roosevelt, according to which the PAC group was to continue 
to sUPpOrt Wallace, as it had cQllllD.1tt.ed itself to doJ but when it became plain 
)S PhiladelRhia. Inquirer, J\l11 14, 19'44. 
l6 New York Times, July 14, 1944. 
--
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that Wallace could. not get the nomination, then Hillman would. do his best to 
keep the friends ot the elO at the Chicago convention from opposing the choice 
of Truman as an alternative. 
On the night ot I<'riday, July 14, the t-resiclent boarded his privatA 
train tor a destination ~p:,th8 West Coast, his movements being kept secret 
aocording to war time regulations. The next day the train halted. at Chicago, 
~here preparations for the opening at the Democratic Convention five d&78 later 
were in tall awing. Democratic cha:lrman, Robert Hannegan, went on board the 
train and received. his last instructions from Roosevelt, who did not show 
himself in Chicago. He ia said to have related aftenards that Roosevelt SElia 
that as to the final choice ot .Byrnes, 'Wallace, or Truman, he and the othel" 
Democratic leaders must first Mclear it with Sidney.u37 The phrase was quickly 
picked up by.b.rtbur Krock of the New ~ Times. What it Signified at. the time 
was that a veto power wu given ito l.i:Ullnan, as the CIO' a political leader, over 
the final choice tor Vice-President at the convention. Roosevelt apparently 
wanted labor' s 'Wholehea~eds\lpporl. 
A t Chicago the eyes and ears of all the press and radio were turned. 
on Sidney Hillman and also Philip Murray, who nowadays cleaved to his side as 
closely as poasible during the convention. From the day of his arrival, on 
Sunday .. July 16, 1944, the chairman of the PAC gave out interviews hour by hour 
at crowded press conferences attended by as many as three hundred reporters 
from eJ.l over the United States, before whom he outlined the policies of the 
OrO-PAC; ''We believe that Mr. WeJ.lace .Ul strengthen the Democratio ticket and 
37 !!!!2£i Times, July 2" 1944. 
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that any other candidate will weaken it. • • • We have no second candidate. 
We are not here to trade with anybody tor any other vice-presidential candidate 
but to put over .Mr. Wallace. n38 
Wallace, beginning with some )50 pledged delegates, appeared to be 
the leading contender. 'l'bis was really illusory, since 589 delegates were 
needed for the nomination and various large blocks of delegates held by favor-
ite sons, such as Bankhead ot Alabama and McNutt of Indiana, were ready to be 
traded over to l'ruman as soon as clear or-dars came trom the professional leader • 
At the early reports th$t Henry W'allace t s chances appeared the strong 
est, the conservative press thundered. against the PAC I> The rumor that Hillman 
and Murray had doomed 14r. Byrnes f candidacy caused newspaper oolumnists to 
lament. tttbe shifting sources of power ••• have produced the anomalous 
situation wherein a James Farley 1» on t.he sidelines and Sidney HUlman ie in 
the forefront of eventa."39 
The ~hicago !ritHUltl, knowing the PAC director since his youth, ob-
served t.hat this former clothing cutter had now ~turned to Ohicago as a Itking_ 
maker, II and that. all the world wondered that Ita man who was not eveD a delegate 
wa.s consulted by everyone herth II Yet he sat tttapping hie hands toeether nerv-
ously, n siuiling, talking about all sorts of things, and saying little .. 40 
Westbrook Pegler, writing in the chain of Hearst newspapers, exclaim-
ed as if in a paroxysm ot passions "HillmanJ,. In God' 8 Name' How came this 
)8 Chicago DaiJ,z l!m, July 17, 1944. 
39 l!!! ~ T:Jt!.es, .lilly 17, 19i.~4. 
40 Chic!gQ Tribp:M, Jul7 20, 1944. 
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non-toiling sedentary conspirator who never held American office or worked in 
the Democratic organization to give orders to the Democrats of the United 
States,u4l 
Other members of the press credited the CIO politioal action in 
Chicago nth beil\l "shrewed, intelligent and resourceful. 'It Wherea.s labor lead-
era or reformers in the paat ha.d tried to insert themselves into political 
{lonventions in an idealistic spirit, Hillman's organiza.tion, as one paper put 
it, w&s no amateur ollt£it, but "had cash, skill, plus discipline. ,.42 
On Tuesday, Jllly 18, two daye af'ter his an-ival in Chicago, Hillman, 
'Who was st¢ng at the Ambassador East Hotel, had Senator Harry 'l'ruman as his 
guest for br.ak£88t. 
)(r. Truman, according to his recollections (as given later to Jon-
a.than Daniels), said that he came to HUlman at that "fancy hotel" as a "Byrnes 
manti. He therefore aSked thet Chairman of the PAC whether he oould _pend on 
his support £or Byrnes. 
"No," said Hillman. • • • He was sariolls that morning. fiNo. We're 
tor Wallace, but we might accept. two other men. Our second choice after 
Wallace would be ~ouglas. I'mlook1~ at our first choice now." 
Truman Pl"ot.,sted, "I' mnot rumingl~ Byrnes 1s my man. H Hillman 
. smiled as he went with hi;11 to the cioor.Ll-3 
.Mr. l'rwnan l s reoollection ot HUlmant • attitude seems to oe borne 
out by the acoount ot another insider, George Allen, who later told of a con-
4l !!! York Journal.-American, July- 20, 19)~4. 
42 !!!.!.2!:k. Dai1Zl!!!!., Jamary 20, 1941.h 
43 Daniels, Tbe !!!!! !£9!! Independence, 24.5. 
ference held early in the convention preliminaries between Sidney Hillman alld 
. 
the Hannegan-Flynn-Wa.lJcer group. The cro le<.i.der W<.i.S told that <Wallace's cause 
was hopeless and was "offered!! Truman. However, Hillman said cautiously that 
"he had nothing against hinl. n44 
By the evening of Tuesda.T. July 18, it was canmon knowledge that Hill 
man had been entertaining Harry Truman at brea.id'aat, ana guesses were being me. 
that he was the CIO's next choice &:i.'"'ter Wallace. The wily Edward Flynn had 
thrown out hints also that the dtilegation trom r,:ew York, though com."llittod to 
Wallace, would shif't to Truman atter the first ballot. 'l'he whole ~Ollth was 
solid against V)allace. 
On the next day, HUlman w8$ kept busy denying all these rumors that 
ere true. A front-page cartoon in the OMego Tribune showed him placing the 
vice-presidential crown on Mr. Truman's he~d. Another newspaper asked. 
What had Mr. BUlman been doing having breakfast with Senator Truman? 
Mr. BUlman referred this question back to Senator Truma.n. He lias most 
discreet abollt this strange breakfast right in the midst or the pro-Wal-
lace crusade. l4r.H1llman 'could tallc for hours without saying an,yth1ng. 
There w ... s much contusion in everyonet a mind by now, but on the night 
of July 18, 194:., Roosevelt's letter ,endorSing Wallace conditionally was r ..... 
leased to the press. It ~hing ~an be said of the letter I .i ts expression 
seemed decidely cool and showed that no sanctions wotild be ta.k:en against thoae 
who opposed Wallace' 
'or these reasons, I personally wou.ld vote for his tJIallace t!l re-
nomination if I were a delegate to the oonvention. At the' same time, I 
do not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the Convention. 00-
vioualy the convention ' ••• should-and I am sU~6it will-give great 
consideration to the pros and C0118 of i1)s choice.4 
On July 19, 1944, the Hannegan-F'lynn group announced that they would 
also release a letter .from the disingenous President, this time endorsing Tru-
man and Douglas. There was alarm in the Wallace camp, and an emergency meet-
ing was held at the Hotel Morrison. Wallace himself had arrived to lead his 
fight, but, as his own friends a<b1.tted, he had no real organization behind. 
him in the Democratic Party save the PAC. He had not even a campaign chaiman 
until the last hours. At the conterence with Wallace were Hillm.an, Murray, 
Francis Biddle, Harold Ickes, C. B. Baldwin and James Carey. Ickes that arte 
noon raised the alarm in the press, declaring that the Democratic bosses were 
conspiring to defeat Wallace. Yet Ickes was said to be working for William O. 
Douglas\ 
That night, Roosevelt telephoned Nationu Chairman Hannegan from the 
West Coast saying there was a war on and he was to "get the convention over 
with quickly" and nominate Harry 'l'ruaan.47 
On Thursday night, July 2O-after all these puzzling prellm:1.nar1es 
(and the Democratic bosses decided to let the public know :who they had alread;r 
chosen)-the convention opened at the Chicago St""diwa, where thirty-three thou 
sand persons were gathered, and Roosevelt addressed them by radio. Henry Wal-
lace hinlself llominated Roosevelt tor President in a powerful speech. The 
stadium crowd said to h~e been packed with CIO followers, set up a mighty 
46 Daniels,.I!!!.!!!:.!.ts! Indeaendenc8, 248-249. 
47 Arthur Krock, l:!!! ~ Times, July 2$, 1944. 
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roar. -We want Wallace'" It continued for twenty minutes. Since the hour 
was late and the orowd .seemed somewhat out of hand, the chairman eho.. not to 
proceed with the formal nom.i.nations of the numerous oandidates tor the V'iee-
presidency and gaV'eled the meeting to a close. 
The next morning, before a smaller gathering, made up mainll ot con-
vention delegates, the last act was played out swiftly. The names ot BaDk-
head, MoJIutt, Lucas, Truman, and finally Wallace were put in nomination. 
Wallace made his strongest showing on the first ballot with 429~ votes, while 
Truman registered .319t and Bankhead ninety-e1ght. On the second ballot 
Truman was even with Wallace at 413 votes. Then the Southern contingent 
nullg to Truman, as did MeNutt's .follOWing, making a majority. y.hereu.pon the 
New York delega.tion, as well. as that of Iowa, passed over to Truman. In the 
end, Hillman stated; "We w$l'$torW'allace always, but not against Tru.man ... 48 
It was said at the timetbat the labor group had permitted themselves 
to be "outgeneraled" by the protessional politicians. and also that Hillman 
had in seae way "dominatedll the convention. Neither conclusion seems t.o be 
true. I t was President Roosevelt who had chosen Truman. The lett-wing eleman: 
in the CIO in private, expressed milch discontent at the way in which Hillman 
had accepted a protege ot Boss Pendergast of Kan&as City instead of trying to 
"ram Wallace down. ff But in reality, hoosevelt was quite unoertain about his 
election prospects in that year of war ,and desired both to conciliate the 
South and to satisfy his party's professional workers, 
48 New lork Mirror, July 22, 1944. 
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Early in the campaign ot 1944, the question was raised as to whether 
the CIO-f'AC was violating the provisions ot the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
as amended by the Smith-Conru.J.ly War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, which made it 
unlawtul for any labor organization to make any contributions in connection 
wi th a Presidential or Congressional election and tor' any "political committee 
to accept or receive such unlawful contributions. The question was also raise 
as to whether the oro Unions and Political Action Committee were acting in 
v101at,i~m of the Hatch Act provisions limiting campaign contributions to tive 
thousand dollars per person or organizat:ton, in connection with Federal elec-
tions. 
To get around this obstacle, the erO-PAC funds nre .frozen, and the 
leaders or the CIO-PAC set up a new organization called the National Citizens 
Political A.ction Camnittee. This NO-PAC, which was also headed by Sidney Hill· 
man originally, was intended to attract non-OIO members as well as unionist., 
and was supposed to raise two separate ca.'l1paign runda or three mUlion dollar. 
each (the legal limit) through voluntary contrlbutioll$, not to exceed live 
thousand per indivichal. Allot this effort and _ney was to be poured into 
the Roosevelt-Truman campaign, with the aid also going to congressiona1. candi-
dates of PAC's choice, pri8c1pally Democrats. 
Hillman protested at the manner in which labor was "singled out tor 
attack" when it entered into primary contests, ",hUe the "royalist famUies, It 
such as the Du.Ponts, who gave a rumored $186,000 at one stroke to the Re-
publican Party, in 1940, were passed over. The financing of the PA.C, he added. 
was an open book which all could examine. Its records and bank accounts, pre-
sented before a House Committee subsequently, on August 28, showed that this 
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nat.ionwide organizat.ion operated on a Sllrpriaingly' modest budget, running 
under fifty thousand dollars a month. Nevertheless, one clauaa ot the Smith-
Connally Act forbade the use ot tunds at labor unions, as well ae corporat.ions 
in polit.ical campaigns.49 
The Senat.e's Campaign Expendit.ures Committee had rendered no opinion 
on the PAC. lbt Hillman, at a meeting of the CIO' s Executive Board in Wash-
iIigton on June 18, said that after the primary' nominating contests and the 
national party conventions were over, the PAO's funda were to be frozen--that 
is, held in escrow--and .. new organization would supplement it and taKe part 
directly in the election campaign itselt. At the end of the Democratic Con-
vention in Chicago. he made ))\101io &nnollnoement of the formation of the Nat-
ional Citizens' Polit.ical .ilot.ion Coam1tt.ee (HC-PAC) as an aux11iary body which 
would draw its support tram a.8soaiat,~ons ot farmers, consumers, protessional 
groups, universit.y people, and churchmen. As it was, the NO-PAC failed utterl • 
The honorary chairman was tienator George W. Norrieu "_es G. Patton, 
head ot the National Farmers' Union, was named vice-preSident, together with 
.Iiss Freda l!rehwey, publisher of the Nation, and Bishop R. R. Wright. Jr. ot 
the Atrican Methodist OhurchJ whUe Protessor Clark Fore:lIl8ll, tormer president 
or the Southern Conterence tor Human Welf'are, was named seeretar,y. The 
Executive Committee was an amalgam ot wealth7 philanthropists, progressive 
political tigures, and Oatholic and Protestant church leaders; its meabership 
49 The PAC's legal counsel pointed out. at the June 1). 1944 hearifl33 
in the Senate, that a narrow interpretation ot the law "would stop everT 
newspaper and magazine in this country from spending mondy on editorials 
tavoring a presidential or congressional candidate." 
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included Elmer A. Benson, former governor of Indiana, tormer Governor Gifford 
Pinchot ot PenneylTania, Mrs. Emmons Blaine ot Chicago, Dr. RObert O. WeaTer, a 
leader or Negro organizations, and A. F. Whitney,president ot the Brotherhood 
of Railway Trainmen. 50 
the objective of the National Citizens' boq was to raise a tund of 
11,500,000 "tor the current campaign in support ot Roo~8Velt and Truman aa well 
as ot oertain "progressiTe ft Republicans and most Democratic candidates tor Con-
resa.. Not more than halt the hoped tor sum was raised that year, much ot it by 
house- to-house oanvassing of workers under the slogan: riA buok tor PAC. ,,$1 
The charges ot huge "slUSh funds," or ot the OIO's "squeezing the 
workers" to contribll~e money lest they lose their jobs-made by Thomas Dewey, t e 
Republican oanc1idate tor President, and others as well-were answered by the PA 
chairman when he opened th~ PAC'. books to a committee of Congress on Augllst 28 
1944 saying J 
I think it apparflnt trom these financial statements that the real 
assets of the two committees is not the money in their treasuries. It tha: 
were 80, we wOIlld. be poor indeed and wOIlld hardly have merited the interes 
and attention which our writ has aroused ..... "hat we have and what our 
opponent. lack cannot be meuured in money. It cannot be bouaht and paid 
tor. It is the enthusiasm and energetic cooperation of millions of 
Americ&ns.'2 . 
On September 27, 1944, Robert E. Stripling, Chief Investigator tor th4 
So Joseph Gaer, .!h!. First Bound, New York, 1942, 212. 
$1 l'he tWlds ot the entire OIO-PAC contributed by the big Ilnions ~ls< 
tell somewhat below their full quota ot 1700,000; and of this only about i.371,Q(~ 
was spent IlP to Augllst 1944, when the balance ot ~289,OOO was placed in escrow. 
52 liearings. HOils. Campa.i&!! .§ependitures Committee, 78th Congress, 
2nd Session, Pt. 1, 91-94. 
House Committee on Un-American Activities, reported in Committee hearings the 
. 
results ot his atatt's study of the new CIO-PAC from the date ot its inception. 
• • • we are now prepared to present to the Committee evi-Said Stripling: " 
dence which makes it clear that the 'JIo-PAC is a by-product ot the Communist 
Party ot the United States and further that its program is now beir}g directed 
and carried on in certain sections of the country by well-kn.own communist lead-
as) era •••• 
Among other things, invtUlltigators found that ot the 141 indiv:t.dIlals 
named by Sidney Hillman as comprising the National Citizens Political Action 
Committee in June 1944, over 80· per cent had had affiliations with the Communis 
Party or ita front organiza.tions during the previous ten years. Scme ot them 
were well-known members ot the Communist Party. Others were strict party-line 
followers. A majority had lent their names and sponsorship to most of the 
communist-front organizations esta,:,lished by the communists in recent years. 
During the 1944 campaign, the two groups .. ..cIO-PAC and its &8sociate, 
NC-PAC-worked hand in glove. They didn't, however, as was already pointed out 
succeed in raising the six million dollars originally intended. 
At the national headquarters of the CIO-PAC on the fitteenth floor of 
205 East 42nd Street, New York, in a small pri',ate office, Hillman as policy-
maker presided over a beehive of political workers and volunteers. Assistant 
chairman, O. B. (ttBeanle") Baldwin at the opposite end ot the tloor was actual~ 
in charge ot the day-by-day administration. With the aid of J it Raymond Walsh, 
research director, a program of nationwide propaganda was mapped Qut, especiall. 
53 Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1944. 
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for sections of the oountry found to be weak in local Democratic action. The 
main job, in the late summer, was to get millions of people registered in time, 
so Lhat they could go to the polls on November 7. In New lark, far example, 
~alsh reported that 900,000 young men had gone to the armed services, while 
600,000 more workers h~ moved to other states in search of war industry jobs. 
It was imperative that every perso.."l eligible to vote be c;)ntacted, precinct by 
precinct, ward by ward and door by door. This grueling taSK was performed with 
the aid ot the American Labor Party I .i\malgi:ilIJlated, and other cro unions 88 well 
as the .Railway Brotherhodds. 
In Ohio, Vice-President Jack !Croll ot the Amalgamated Union headed th 
regional PAC orgL'1illation.. In the Chicago cent .. , former Congressman Raymond 
McKeough worked effectively with officers of the Am&lgamated Union and the 
United Steel Workers to speed the registration drive. In Michigan, where the 
Democr&ts had shown themselves extremely weak in. 1942, many hlllldreds at United 
Auto Workers f volu.nteers went out to ring the doorbells of prospecti. voters 
and see to it tt~at, they registered in 1:J.me. Tbu.s an improvised tlgrassroots" 
orga~ization was set in operation, b&sed chief~ on the local ~iion orfices 
dotting the cou.ntry from tJew England to C~litornia. One political reporter 
wrote: 
The CrO-pA.C has been hard at work since February and should play a 
big part in the November results. There are )28,000 members in Illinois 
with 250,000 concentrated in the Chicago area. 
Raymond McKeough ••• has had a list of all CIO members in the state 
prepared and ohecked against lists ot registered voters, in order to .ee 
that every CIO Man and woman votes. A tedious job is being carried out 
thoroughly. Test samples indicate that abou,t 40 per cent qf the potentia 
·cro vote is not registered--ll5,OOO,voters-- who are the object ot the PA 
drive. • • • iioosevelt looks stronger in Illinois in 1944 than in 
Sl 
.. 
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Reports ot record-breaking registration came to. the PAC headquarters 
in New Yo.rk from Chicago, 10s Angeles, and St. Louis during the summer. In 
St. LOllis, as many as thirty-six thousand were brought in tor registration on 
a single day, and one early result was the defeat ot the "isolationist" Senato 
Bennett C. Clark in the Demoeratic primaries. In Wal'Zle County, tichigan (whie 
embraces DetrOit), only 122,000 persons had registered for the 1940 electione. 
But now ona-hundred thousand 0.1' mont ot the younger workers were in the Anq 
and less re,istration was expected. However. in a whirlwind campaign directed 
by the CIO leaders, one thousand canvassers went out day and night in early 
October, so. that when registration closed on Ootober 18, the record-breaking 
number ot 800,000 had been enrolled as voters. Michigan '*was stirred up as 
never before It in any election. The slme was true of o.ther populous states, 
such as California, Ohio and Illinois, whose votes oounted heavUy in the 
election results.» 
By October, Roosevelt's field SIlM'eys ahowed that the tarnout of 
voters would be UDl1sually heavy, and he felt easy about the November outcome.> 
Behind the political a.rmy' worldng in the field, there oame also a 
rolling barrage or pamphlets, lecd'lets, stickers, and throw-aways, produced 
mainly at the New York headquarters or the PAC. Dr. Raymond Walsh directed 
this propaganda with the aid of a small stat"f ot writers and journalists, in-
5h .!!!!!2!:!~, July 26, 1944. 
>5 Ibid. 
-
S6 Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt !W'! Hopkins, New York, 1948, 820. 
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eluding Joseph Gaer and Wilbur Fe~, the p~phlets being illustrated by a 
group of artists under the direction of ben Shahn. The titles or some of the 
pamphlets werel ! Political Pr1mer !!£ ill Americans, .'!l!!!.!!.!2!!£ Aurica; 
l'!'!!! Feoile t s Program !&. ~J The Negro Ie.!2WiJ catholic Preu Su.ppOJ"t,s ~J 
~verz Worker ! VoterJ ~ 12 !h2 Breadlines !.11:.h DtnieZJ Jobs !2! !!:! Wer The 
!EJ etc. In all, some eighty-three million pieces of llterature were d1stri 
utad throughou.t the cOWltry, their promotion among organizations of aU kinds 
bei~ pushed by Walsh's assistant, Dr. Frederick Palmer Weber. T1me j(Hazlne, 
though pro-Dewey, acknowledged that thi. part of the PAC job was "tar and away 
the slickest political propaganda 1n a generation. ltS1 
Literally a deluge of literature poured forth from the mouth of the 
CIO-f'AC. Joseph Gaer was their main pen. He opened tire with his first art! 
Bretton ~ 11!2 Mysterl. Next came fhe People's ~!9£ Reconve£sio~1 
which dealt with the cro· a idea Of how it sould be done. Some of these pamphl 
were like comic b~--each page or two with a cartoon • 
. During this presidential. campaign of 1944, books, pamphlets, rad1o, 
speeches, and whatever else they could use were focused on getting Roosevelt, 
Truman cmd the rest of the democrats elected. 
From the start or the campaign, the Repablicans were advised by an 
old student of politics, Fr~~ R. Aent, the Washington columnist of the ~­
,t.j&lpra~, to focus their attack on Hillman and the "Reds. It "The clearer it 
is made that Mr. Hillman,&d, PJ!..C are not only running but financing :Mr. Roose-
velt's campaign, the greatBrwill be the reaction among the voters who resent 
• • • the professional labor bosses.It,58 
Mr. Kent's adVice to the Republicans proved to be ot some worth. Aa 
the campaign lengthened its stride, more and more evidence was unoovered to 
raise $U.spicious quest,ions concerning PAC af'tUiation with Communist organiza-
tions. 
The iepublican propagandists, commanding about 85 per oent of the 
cO'.mtry's llawsl}apers, fa.stened on the phrase attributed by Arthur Krock ot the 
l!!!.!2£! Time~ to President Roosevelt in his orders to Hannegan on the vice-
presidential. choicet "Olear it lrl.,th Sidney.1t Put as such things happen, it 
soon came out UI "Clear Everything With Sidney, It which was placarciefl all 
over the United States. A close stuctr of the propaganda technique u.sed by the 
Republican supporters ot Dewey and J OM Bricker has shown that the idea they 
stressed mainly werel 
1) the menaoe of labor's entrance into politics; 
2) the use ot "huge slu.sh funds" by labor) 
3) alleged communistic influences back of the cro; and 
4) the vague 1firrationalfl appeal ot anti....semitiSll, directed against 
Sidney Hillman in particular. 
On one occasion d.l.ring this explosion ot sla.nder, Governor Earl 
Warren of' Cal.1tornia, one of the leading Republioan speakers, admitted that. he 
had censored oue of the "Clear-1t4!.tb-Sidney" pampblets used by llr. newel" s 
aides as being obviously libelous or datemator.r.,59 
sa Baltimore Sun, Ju.ly' 12, 1944. 
59 New lor. Times, Au.gt1st 30 and Aug\1st 31, 1944. 
Roosevelt had figured on a very olol]e race. On Nov_bar 7, 1944, 
forty-five million went to the polls. The populous states of Ohio, Michigan, 
Illinois and California were carried by the Democrats, though lt1aIlY' soldiers 
serving abroad failed to vote despite the simpl1tied soldiers' ballot. In 
New York the contest was close, with Roosevelt ahead by only 300,000 out of 
six million votes. Roosevelt's margin of victory was 3,100,000 in excess ot 
.Mr. Dewey's 21,300,000. Roosevelt ha.d won again and was still the wldeteated 
champion of the political world. 
The Death Of Roosevelt And Its Results 
............-. ................................................ 
On AprU l2, 1945, labor joined the rest of the Nation by dipping ita 
tlag to halt~t. The country had lost one at its greatest leaders, and 
labor had lost its eyes. In his stead rose labor'lI choice for vice-president 
Harry S. Truman. The first man from W.ssourl to becolne President of the Unit. 
States. Political circles buzzed with intense speculation that April in 1945. 
Evel70ne wondered whether or not Harry S. Tru.marl would continue the New Deal 
policies. Particularily concerned with the future were the CIO leaders who 
had built their powerful orgauJization amid an administrative atmosphere ot 
friendly benevalance. At the outset of his administration, lItr. Truman, in 
phrases of touching humility, expressed his ~,¢n3e of embarrassment at finding 
himself in the shoes at one who had been a master among politicians. 1'0 be 
sure, ltr. Truman had vowed to continue the Roosevelt program, which, however, 
he now re-defiued as the Fair Deal, a term 8tlggesting dilution. 
Under Truman there was a relapse to the rather casual pre-do08evelti 
type of Democratic presidential leadership that switched unpredictably and 
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spells of plumping for reform legislation, ineffeotually enough, before a Con-
gress that seem.cd ripe for "reaction. tI 
For the post of Secretary of Labor, Truman appointed Louis Scbwellen-
bach from the State of Washington in place at Miss Perkins, who, with other 
New Dealers, had resigned on Roosevelt.a death. The President's chief ass1st-
ant. in the work ot labor mediati,;,u was now Dr. John Steelman. This last ap-
pointmont, it was claimed by labor, presaged the altered climate of relations 
with labor. 
'Hns sfring ot 191..5 there was considera.ble debate over the future at 
the PJ~CJ some of the CIO's ra.d1cals urged that it be adapted as the instrument 
of ti. third-party movement. PAC leaders, however, strongly opposed sach a 
course as merely serving to ensure the victOr-I of reactionary RepUblicans. 
Great stress was laid on what was called the proven vitality of the two-party 
system in our country. The PAC, at least for the present, was to be limited 
to Uri ding on the b~ckn of one or the other of the two major parties (though 
t~~ was, tor all practical purposes, the democratic party). The other 
alternative, which was rejected was that of becoming the organization of a 
protesting minority group with out any office or bargaining power. 
At this same ti:'l€:, fears were persifrt.ently expressed by certain CIO 
execlltives that the PAC would overshadol'l the CIO itself.. There were those who 
urged. th(;.t the National Citizen's f'J.C should have been wound up after the 1944 
electioI1, or turnad over to sane liberal gro'J.p outside the labor movement. 
On May 11, 1945, Hillman, unde~ pressure, resigned AS chairman of the National 
Citizens' PAC (while retaining his post a.s cha.irn:lan of the CIO-PAC), and ex-
Governor Elmer Benson of Minnesota was elected in his place. C. B. Baldwin, 
vice-chairman, remained the executive director. It is interesting to note tha 
it was rlllllored t.hat the professional pollticiaIlS in the lJemocratic Party, 
from President 'l'ruman down to the old ward captains, heartily wished that the 
two Political Action CQlID:tittees !llight be buried and forgotten. 
Nevertheless, plans for the PAC's intet'v.ntion in local and congrea-
sional elections in 1945 were ldd out by the CIa lea.ders in the spring of tha 
year on an o.mbitious scale. 
C HAP'!'ER III 
THE NADIR OF mE; PAC 
The tull-scale 1946 campaigning ot the CIO's Political Action Com-
mittee got its offioial send-orf in Atlantio City, when the fi.f'teenth biennial 
convention or the Amalgamated Clothing Workers or .it.>nerica (010) was turned int 
a political. rally.. When it was over, ten serAtors and twenty-three members of 
the House ot &epres&~tatives had been listed tor defeat. 
Politioal significance of the oonvention was not long in ShEf,;ing u.p .. 
HUlman' e keynote address was strongly critical o.f B. Carroll Reece, chairm.an 
of the liepublioan National C~~~ittee, and the party's policies. Floor speeche 
carried out the theme, and it wa.s brought to a high pitch when Phillip Murray, 
CIa President , delivered an address denyir",,-; t..~at OO~t'1ltni$tic aims and sympathi 8 
dominated the CIO·. politioal win~' and pointing out certain merD.bers o! Congres 
that were slated for defeat. uijigh on the list or PAC hopes is the defeat of 
two Democratic senators, Kep..neth McKellar of Tennessee and Harry F. Byrd or 
Virginia, who are spearheading the latest drive in Congress for. new labor laws 
liost are Democrats that the PAC considers in open and avowed coalition with th 
Republican bloc in Congress. u1 
Act,i vitias this ;}reaI' were to be concentrated in one hundred congres-
1 Btu!ine;s 'fleek, Ma.y 18, 1946, 10.). 
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sio~ districts in sevent~en states, particu).arly Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana . 
ltlslSouri, Illinois.. Wiscor..si.1., Mi;mesota, and Michigan. PAC than a:nnou.nced it 
would be represented in 1ew York by the AmericWl Labor Party and "silek to de-
f'eat Governor Thomas .i;.;. Dewey i.l~ rlis race for re-election .. !t2 
AS PAC's tom-'toms were being heard at the Amalgamated Oonvention, its 
ottices were receiving first reports on three pr:btary tests, in Florida, Ala-
bama, and Ohio. Results were ter from conclusive but PAC reported t,hat they 
were t'g';j)llE:i,'ally tavorable. n 
"Former Governor Spes$a;rd Holland. of' Florida, endorced by labor" won 
nomination as Democratic nominee tort-he Senate. George A. Smathers won nom 
ation over Representative Pat Cannon. whose re-election was opposed by labor. 
There was lit Us evidence, however, that PAC votes had materially influenced 
either outcome.") 
Simul tan1ously. 
In Alabama, a PA.C endorsed candidate topped the gubernatorial ballot 
but fa.ces a J;'tunofr tor party nomination, and another PAC candidate, R 
resentative Albert Raina. succesaf'ally overcame a challenge trom Joe 
Starnes, a former Dies Committeeman. Od.ds favored both, even without P. 
aid. More significantl:r, PAC tailed to secure nomina;t.ion of Represent 
tive Luther Patriek, Birmingham, over a political newcomer, and veteran 
in a race it had considered certain. 
And stUll "PAC • 8 candidate in the Ohio Democratic primary wa.s bad]. 
beaten by Senator James W. But£m&n, who carried strong backing from other la 
or organizations. t~ 
2 Ibid. 
-
3 Ibid., 104. 
-
4 Ibid. 
-
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Despite much thunder on the left against President T~~ts dQaeat1c 
and foreign pOlicy" Hil~'1lan indicated clearly that the CIo-PAC .."ould endorse 
the l'rll:man il.dmi:nistration in 1946. But in Yay the primary elections in Ohio 
and lJew Jersey proved disappo1.ntin,~" several candidates espoused by the PAC 
being defeated--irl one ills\"snce b:r Representative Fred A. Hartley ot New Jer-
sey, who was to be co-author of the Taft-Hartley Act. Then on July 10, 1946, 
3idnay HUlman suddenly died and v.as apared the trial ot seei~ his PAG go 
down to defeat in that ott-year election. 
!.£ ... De ... f;;.;;6 .... < t ... t 
The 1946 Congressional elections handed PAC what the CIO itself des-
crllied as a "stunning dei'eCi.t." For the first time in fourteen years, labor 
votes did. not land together. Candidates endorsed by the PAC 'Were buried under 
an avalanche of opposition ballots. Its eonstitutional amendment campaigns 
all ended in failures. 
The landslide even swept over area.s in which labor had been tradition-
ally strong. In Wayne CO'.wty, Michigan (wherein Detroit lies), where CIO'. 
United Auto 'Workers claimed two hul1dI'ed and fifty thou.sand members, PAC actin 
ties were only slightly more successful than in less organhed sections of the 
countr;r.S 
'i'he &l'lSWer seemed bel;.>tedly obvious. PAC had swept throur;h its early 
elections on the political coat-tails of the 1;;: te President Roosevelt. At the 
same ti;l'l.c it !lad the guidance and support plus the persl,)ual. appeal of the la.te 
Sidney H1l~, master strate~ist in labor politics to guide them through. 
S Bu;siness Week, November 23, 1946, 90. 
But now both of these leaders had past from ~he scene and PAC lost its unify-
ing foree. 
To one of its supporting groups CIo-PAC l101f seemed "little more than a 
paper organization, limited largely to speech-maldng." Thu8 said the National 
Maritime Union in its analYSi8 of the "extent of the reactionar,y v1ctol7'." 
And a1mUar complaints from other unions studded the convention floor disCWl-
sions of why' la.bor political action had failed this t1me.6 Ibt these same 
organizations and individuals were soon to learn that Jack KroU, Hillman's 
succes.or as director of Clo-PAC, and the rest of the PAC torce were a force 
to be reckoned with., 
The official reply was that PAC "will intensify and expand. ita actin 
There will be no halt in our work. There ldll be no retrencbrne.nt." For Jack 
Kroll the WQ'I'd was, ·Oet on with the job • • • tor which we have juat begun 
to ttght.,,117 
Calls tor a third party-principally from the Socialist.-m1nded segment 
of the CIO-Were not yet taken aeriou.ly. Despite some talk ot bitter disap-
pointment with the Democratic pat'ty, criticism of the Truman AdlDinistration 11: 
deliberately avoided. Leader. cautiously said that, at least for the present, 
PAC and it. allied groups should work wi thin the framework of the existing 
parties. 
There was little doubt that that meant "within the framework ot the 
Democratic Party." 
6 Ibid., 90. 
7 Ibi4. 
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While it attempted to amend its fences by "da.;r-to-day activities in 
wards and precincts ".....tlich was a job in itselt' J in the opinion ot allied po-
litical leaders who taced the same sort of task in reouilding battered party 
machines-PAC had set another big goal. It was heading tor a detensive pro-
gram in Congress to "preserve the rights won by labor and the people during the 
Roosevelt era. 1t8 But even in the beginning, there was serious doubt in Wash-
ington that the program would get congressional approval. 
A lot depended on the outcome of the govermtent's struggle with John 
L. 1..ew1.8 and on the strike situation. Congress was not expected to get excited 
about restrictive action unless sQme big and bad strikes developed. In this 
instance, Lewi. forced the hand of Congress and the White House received 8. 
tough batch ot labor bills trom the legislators. 
Up untU Lewis t move, 4llch ptopoNJ.s Il$ that by Senator Joseph Ball 
for a closed-shop ban were believ$'Cl too be moving toward a sidetrack.9 
To the new col3gl"e:B1onal leaden, labor's voting strength was still 
important and, if again un.1fi~d, might determine &nother presidential race. 
So congressional advisers were. urging upon the majority a firm, but 
conciliatory attitude toward labor, unless union militance forced a fight, whicl 
it did. They would, it was argued, give labor politicians the fewest possible 
crucial iSBaes on which to rebuild the PAC for battle alongside the Democrats 
on the comeback trail in 1948. 
Communism .!!! The _CI;;;.;Q ..... -P; ;;;A;.;;;.O 
8 Ibid. 
9 Business!!!!. November 16, 1946, 5. 
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As Jack Kroll came on the 8ceM, replacing Sidney Hillman as director 
ot the PAC, other problems started to plague the CIO along with its political 
defeat. 
There i8 no evidence that Kroll himself .... as ever a communist sympa-
thizer, although many at hi.B original statf on the PAC inherited trom HUlluan 
may have been. 
On October 20, 1946, the M08C01l' Radio broadcast, a talk in English by 
commentator A. Ossipov,beamed at the United States, in which he urged Americans 
to back the PAC and its "progressive" candidates in order to prevent Ii reacticm. 
arylt Congress. Ossipov said, in parts 
Let me repeat-election struggle is taking place in America bet .... een 
progressive forces ot country and reaction. It is not accidental that 
CIO Political Action COmlllittee supports Progressive candidates in. e10C-
tions, whatever their party affiliation and opposes reaction&r:' oaudlciate , 
Republican or Democratic, and has already contributed to defeat at Wheel 
and other reactionaries in primaries. 
Chicago convention ot American Progressive Organizations took firm 
and correct stand by deciding to work to secure five million votes in 
eleotions. Decision was adopted by convention to mobUize half' million 
people to pus~O campaign tor nomiriation and return of Progressive candi-
dates .. • • • . 
This "1<:18s of death" was promptly repudiated by Jack Kroll on October 
22ncl. Said Krolll 
While the world press and radio are free to commend all elected cand-
idates in all ooontz-iee as has been the p~actiae tor generations, the 01 
PAC regards as completely unwarranted and thoroughly disavows ~ foreign 
influence or interference in our domestio election oontests. I cannot 
s t.G.te this too emphatico.lly on behalf of our committee_ 
We repudiate and rejectallettorts by our political enemies to tar 
us with an alien brush. 
10 Text as recorded in LendenJ Mimeographed. 
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The record ot the OIO-PAC since its inception in July, 194), has been 
absolutely clear. It is an official committee ot the Oongress of Indust-
rial Organizations representing over 6,000,000 workers with their familie • 
CIO and CIO-PAC are the voice of over 14,000,000 Americans loyal. to Ameri a 
and American institutions. Both in war III d peace this has been amply de-
monstrated beyond a doubt • • • .11 
-The CIa, as an entity, is a delicate balance between communist and 
anti-communist elements. Its top leaderShip shudders at the thought that the 
balance may be tlpset and open warfare result. Keeping that was from breaking 
out is the CIO's biggest prob~em.·12 
But the communistic infiltration continued to persist until the 1948 
"Red Purge." The increasing rank and fUe attack on left-wing power within 
the CIa developed a center of gravity early in 1947. Its locus, like the 
headquarters of the Communist movement that it opposed, was located in New 
York Oity. 
Last week representatives of 68 locals in 1.3 CIO international unions 
functioning in and around New York formally organized the Trade Union C 
mit tee for Democracy. Its tirst objective is to get the leftish Greater 
New York (city) Industrial Union ConneU reorganized. 
Its tactics call for its affiliates to do a better trade union job 
than the Communists, to label & .Red & Red and make no mistakes in ident-
1tication. Its ultimate purpose is to drive the Communists from positio 
ot influer.,ce and control in the labor movement.13 
Later on it was reported that. ·Steadily mounting pressure against 
CIO· s left-wing reached new peaks this week, after marked gains recently in 
state cotlncil elections.14 
11 New York Herald Tribune, October 23, 1946. 
---------12 Business Week, December 28, 1946, 114. 
-
13 Business Week, Jlarch 15, l,947, 94. 
14 Businus Week, September 13, 1947, 94. 
In New York, the ij'. S. Depart!nent of .Justice sOllght deportation of 
John Santo, organ1.zatio:.1al director of the Transport Workers Union and chief 
aid to T. W. U. President, Mike Quill. Both were listed among CIO's leading 
leftists. However, Quill was U>.ter cleared of a:IrJ' such charges. 
In Detroit, Walter Reuther, president of ti:e United Auto Workers, 
and now also president ot the CIO, was reported in his strongest position so 
tar. 
"Reuther completely subdued lett-wing foes at the recent qc.arterly' 
U. A. W. executive board meeting in Buffalo. tt15 
Delegates to eIO t s annual convention in Boston during that yeu 
debated endlessly'. The new law ('raft-Hartley), the split L} the labor move-
ment and internal Communist troubles piled on top ot its political defeat 
were giving 010 its _iggest headaches sinee John L. Lewis deserted the "house 
of labor" which he had rounded. 
1, Bll8inesfJ Week. September 20, 1941, 104. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ZENITH OF THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 
On January 24, 1948, the OIO.PAC's executive board voted seven to two 
for a resolution con~~g the third party idea for 1948. Shortly thereafter, 
Ja.ck Kroll a'1noWlced that the crO-PAC stood against Henry Wallace's third 
party.l 
After that, PAC groups allover the country began to oust left-winger 
from their organization who had supported Wallaoe's third party. On August ), 
1948, a UP diSPatch trom W~shington <lnnounced that' 
the Congress ot Indnstrial Organizations is clearing its official. 
house ot Wallace eupporters, apparently as a preliminary to endorsing 
President Truman for election, it was revealed today. The union has 
1'orbi4den its members to use the eIO name in getting campaign fu.n.d.s 1'or th4 
Progl'6Ssive Party- Members of local 010 Political Action Committees are 
bei~ expelled for indioating the union backs the Wallace and Taylor tick-
et. 
Another UP 1 tem ot the same date added that: 
Officials said they have just about completed their purge of Wallacei 8S 
£rom. hi.ah positions on the Political Action Committee and Industrial Union 
CouncU. 
Murray set the pace last winter when he relieved Lee Pressman as 
general counsel for the CIO !1nd fired Harry Bridges as CIO Director for 
1 Des )ioing Register, February 10. 1948. 
2 New !2.!:!Herald Tribune. August 4, 1948. 
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.... n Cal1fornia. be replacea Presidollt .Iilbert J. Ii'! tagerilld and 
horetary-l'reasuJ"C" JUlius Emspak ot tM Yn1ted .iiJ.ectrioal Workers on ttle 
Politioal Action CO:lI.mittee. 
All_ S. Ha;'Wood. director ot organiZ1fli, John BrophT, n.&.tional dire 
tor ot Industrial Councils, and Jack Kroll, director or Poll Ucal ",-et1on. 
toll owed up w1th orders '0 .. uOol'Qinate ~rouP$ I~t.o clean hOllse. ff 
'lh4 ero estimates that more tban 92 per oont of' the to'Jr hundreQ 
subordinate eO;J.ncils have conformed to 010 polioy opposing Wallace.' 
Bu.t, how eftect!ve or how tar-re~ching this would be at that tae was 
:$t111 ail open qlleBtion. Bow fu would cro'. lef't,....w1r.g go beyond reject~ 
fhilip Uurray' a stand &.gainlt Henry '!":allace'l The answer .. as alrea<tr apparent 
in February or 1948. when the small, lett1st Farm &qu1pmont 'frOl"kars Union pro-
rlded a quick sounc:t1.l:li boiil.rd tor the Wallace bloo. :telegates to it special YEi 
conventlon--c.alled to study' Tatt-Hartle1 stri.iwu ....... re asked to V'Ot.e leo pel" 
cent Stlpport. tor the new third part.y. 
F&W, whose executive board was f'1rat in the eIO to endorse Wallaco, 
was in the lead a second tille: It Wd the first major CIa union to take u.p the 
third party issue officially. 
One "ele later, 1n::J.eY'eland, a pattern 'Was set tor cro rlght-wing 
aetian. The Industrial Union or Marine and Shipbuilding Worker. (very anti-
Communist) opened ita biennial conyoemion on February 9, 1948. Its prea1dllmt, 
John Gnen, called tor........and got-strong SIlpport tor Murray's political progra. 
it F 
B'II!a!f! !!!!s. reported that; 
The J'lM comrenUon wUl torecast what other CIO lef't41ng uniomJ will 
do. i'inat. ~Slf decides about t'dture support. tor Clot 8 rOlitical jt.Ot1on 
OOllmittoe, for instance, may foretell Pl.-,G'IS late. And 1Mlt a a.ttit\\d.e to-
.... d Clot 8 rtli:bt may show ju.st, how seriQus the crack in Clv -1' be.4 
3 ltAa aRlDHI 1'." iulguat 4, 1948. 
4 !J,tney!:!!.& January 31, 1948, 10. 
Murray got oft the fence between Ci.vl s rlght,...wmg and lett wing tac-
tioll8 in Washington on Jamary 24, 1948, as had been predicted the previ0t18 
tall. 11e ottered his right-wingers leadership bY' 
1. Flatly calling for a resolution endorsing the Marshall Plan} 
2. Openly identifying the 010 leftish leaders who supported the third 
party.!:> 
~urray' 8 stand severel;r strained relations between CIOIS right and 
left. But tor the present ancopen break: was not expected. 
There was an obVious reason: Neither bloc was read¥' to lose the 
benefits of economic solidaritl. Bat even this reason was not to stand the 
acid test of 't:1me. 
CIQ executive board members backed ll4u.rray's opposition to a third 
party by a vote at thirty-three to eleven. five were absent, two abstained 
from voting. CIO went 011 record that it was nPolltieally llllWiae to inject a 
third party into the poli1;ioal. scene: in 1948.,,6 
In announcing the acttlral vote (an unprecedented step in CIO* s tW81 Vi 
:fear history) !luTray made this point: liThe majority has laid down a policy 
which all unions now have a tm.oral. obligation' to follow.»7 
&noy .Bridges, prea1dent. ot the left-wing Intema1;ional Longshore-
men's and. Warehousemen's 'Union, 'did not agree. 
"He told reporters that there i8 nothing to bind (;10 unions to a:tJ':T 
national policy. The organizations for which he spoke wUl continue efforts 
, Business~, January)l, 1948, 70. 
6 Ibid., 71. 
-
7 Ib D., 72. 
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in behial£ of the Wallaoe third. party. n8 
And albert J. £i'itzger&ld, president. ot the United Eleotrioal" Radio 
and Machine WorJiCers, backbolle of the ClOt s leftooolWing" demanded that llurray 
issue a "olear declaration" that international unions can "endorse and support 
such candidates as they see fit. It By such a declAration, he said, llurray 
could avoid widening "divisions in our rank:s." i'itzgerald called tor cont.1nu-
ance ot the P.ti.C. It can "continua to function effectively in present ciroum-
stances. ft he said, it it would limit itself to congressional eleotions.9 
These circumstances led to a FEW conf'arence. Its preaident, Qr&.llt 
W. Oakes, was one of the eleven p):"o-Wallace voters, and he and FBW's thirteen 
member board had refuaed to tile xlor"..,Gcamunist attidavits under the ,raft-Hart-
le1 Aot. 'l'here was growing qppositioll in the anion to the leadei"&hip on the 
grol.ulda that the existence of ;uany FEW locals were being jeopardized. 
A. grollp led by Thomas Kelly, an ousted international representative, 
was gettiug set to challenge incumbent leaders on the 1'-8 issue. Even it it 
weI'e to bear little truit in the form 0.£ votes Oii.gainst the incumbents, the 
at't.ack was hoped to be importcmt because it could have paved the way tor 
hitchovers by right-wing looals to Walter Reuther' 8 On! ted Automobile, Air-
craft and Agr10ul t\lral ImplementWorlc ers (UAW) '" 
Top leaders of oro were 8trongly opposed to a third-party movement 
at that time.. They wanted the Politioal Aotion Committee united behind Presi-
dant Truman tor reelection. Scattered votes, they were oonvinced, wou14 aid a 
8 Business Week, Janua17 )1, 1948, 72. 
9~ 
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Republican CaIldidate. 
CIO opposition to a third party placed let't-wlng unions on the spot. 
The leftls"ts, with tha United Electrical, Radio and Machine 'Workers in the 
lead, were for tiallace; they had also been, both physically and financially, a 
backbone for the PAC.10 
The nine vice-presidents of' the CIO met wi. th President Philip Murray 
in Viashington on Jarru.8.ry 21, 194.8, to study the problens posed by the situat10 • 
Only one voice was raised for Wallace--that of Albert J. Fitzgerald, TJE presi-
dent. 
the leftists, strategy apparently 'Was to fight a delaying action. 
llbey did not want CIO and PAC to go on record against Wallace-at least not to 
soon. But meanwhile, their unions had jumped the gun by giving ?Jallace a soli 
sendotf. UBI s support, throllgh its newspaper, brought a general. wan:dng !'rom 
Kurraf for ero unions to steer clear of pledges of support to candidates. 
There were two previews of the CIO problem in January ot 1948. The 
N.ft York State executbre board of t<',e CIO denounced Wallaoe's third party 
plans atter a heated right-left political debate. Unions represented split· 
evenly (fourteen to fourteen) on the issue, but a per capita vote favored the 
right-wing position against a third party candid.acy.ll 
And one day later, the right-wing unionist.s broke with the American 
Labor Party, which HllL'lla.n ha.d worked 80 hard to buUd uP .. over its plans to 
endorse Wallace. ALP bad been PAC'. ataunch political arm in New York sinee 
10 Bw$1nes8!!!£' Januarr 10. 1948, 86. 
11 Ibid. 
.. 
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HUlman 'WOn oontrol over it from wbinsky. X:0nically enollgh, its biggest 
un10n bloc, tr~ Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (OIG), which HilL~an 
had founded.. led the exodus from the ALP. 
other unions which quit an act! ve role in the labor party were the 
CIO'. auto 'Workers and steel workers. Control was lett wholly in the 
hands ot iro-Commwdsts and party-liners. ALP irnmed1ately endorsed 
Wallace. 1 
A tew years later there came to light the story by an ex...commun1st 
tha.t the American Labor Party took its orders straight from the Kremlin. Ita 
infUtration was quit:.e axtensi'if8, gOing all the wa.y trom participation in a 
committee appointed by the mqor of New York City to investigate Communistic 
intiltration to ranking men on the city police torce.1) 
Atter this break with the ALP, the 1948 political strategyot the 
CIO's lett-wing leaders began to take detinite shape. 
In International Un10ns u,nder their Control, the leftists continued 
to support. Henry nallace and oppose the M<1l"shall Plan. 
In State CouncUs .. where the:r're more vulnerable, the latt-wingers 
plugged tor a "hands-ott" pollcy on both issues.14 
As was expected .. Lhe leftists' policy line 'Was set at the Farm Equ1 
ment and Metal Workers Union convention held. in Chicago early in 1948.15 
F.EW bolted the CIo-PAC program on the Wallace and Marshall Plan issues. 'l'he 
attack on the European Recovery Program, launched by President Grant W. Oakes 
can onl1 be described as merciless. 
12 Ibid. 
-13 Chicago TribuI!!' July 2), 1953. 
14 Business Week, Febru8l7 21., 1948, 10). 
1$ Businees!!!!, January 31, 1948, 70. 
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But despite 801ne opposition, Oakes' stand on ERP and Wallaoe won by 
. 
heavy majorities. So did a proposal that FEW stand tirm in its decision not 
to CO!ll.plT with the 1' ... H law. And some three hundred delegates, claiming they 
represented seventy-five thousand workers, were just abou·t;. unanimous on one 
"hot" issue. They pledg-ed an all-ou.t, ""oare knuckles" tight on "1U\r vultures 
from another CIO union" who would tr;rto raid FEW plants.16 
All in all, it can be said that the leftists could have gone as far 
&8 they wanted to-or me.mbers would perm! t-in devii.l.ting from 010 policT in 
their internationals. 
But it was a d1ff$l"ent story in the state councils. 
The ClOt s 1946 convention made it mandatory tor state and 1".1 ooun-
cils to follow CIO pal icY, although the consequences or this mandate were not 
telt until 1948. Then Philip Murra.;r did not hesitate to oust leftists who re-
tused to come along. 
&.r!r7 Bridges had been mentioned as one who might be t.he first knicke 
by ~ayls axe. True" he finally did get. it; but in the begimdtlg, he 
smoothly walked around it. 
" .. • Bridgee carefully avoided rousing Murray'" Scotch temper. He 
dodged the third party and Marshall Plan issues at a California councU 
board meeting. Inatead., Bridges led the left in a succes8ful fight to 
sidetraok ftdisputed issues"--and to oor~ine state council action to in-
trastate ma.tters on whioh there is "l1niveraalft agreement..11 
Nation report.ed that Philip Murray liU laying down thflt law to 010 
rebela for all the world as though the 010 were the ;nost disciplin.ed politioal 
16 $siness freek. May 1, 19L.8 .. 98-100. 
17 Business Week .. Februar,r 21, 19M3, 10). 
-
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group 10 the countr,y.lB 
!!Q. Election C~ner8 sg Their Baekqoo.nd8 
As of )(ay' 17, 1949, top otficials irl the CIO-PAC were' 
Directors Jack Iroll, Vice-President, Amalgamated Clvt.hing !harkers ot America. 
Assistatit Directorl tiltord E. Dudley, L&bor .£telations Counsellor. 
Secretary-TreasurerI David J., l4cDonald, Seoretar;r-Treasurer, United Steelwork ... 
o!' America (now Presidem ot the United Steelworkers ot America). 
Comptroller: George Rettinger. 
Pu.blic 1lelations Director: HeIU7 Zon. 
Research Director' lirs. Fritzie llanuel. 
tfen:ry Zon once addressed a Washington Bookshop meeting, a Oommunist 
dominated organization, on October lB, 1940, on the subject ot tf1abor and the 
Ji'.'lections"<t There is no evidence that he was or had been a lnember ot any pro-
Communist organizations. On the other hand, 'lUtord E. Ihdle;r, tOl"l1erl:r _-
ployed as So tield examiner by the National Labor Relations Board, was at one 
time a member ot the Washington Bookshop, a member ot the ffa.ehington Cc.mmdttee 
tor i.id to China atid the .-ashington Oonmd:ttee tor Democratic Action. lul three 
organizations had numerous Conwunist. sympathizers in their midst.19 
David J • .Mel.ionald had a previous record of at.f1.l1atioI .. with the 
National. Council of Amerioan-Soviet Friendship (d~e1ared. subversive by the 
Attorney General), and be was one of the sponsor. of a Madison Sqllc.re Garden 
18 Nation, December 13, 194&. 
19 Source material on CIQ....PAC in private .fUes of a member of the 
llOUse of Hepresent.atives made a.vailable to the author. 
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Ral.ly on November 8, 194} ~1i.ma.x1ng t.he C'Ongt"ess ot American-Sov1et Friendship 
. 
held in New York, N'Ovember 6, 7, and 8.20 Later, however, he apparently made 
-
a cleareu.t break nth such groups, tor 6..'1 item in the !!! York Times listed 
WcDonald as having made a speeoh oritioal ot Communists and their activities in 
the labor movement, as the Atlantic City convention 'Of the newly--organ1zed 
Utility Workers Union.2l At. this meeting, Communists wer& barred trom holding 
membership in the union t.hrough an $1'lti-Gam.mu.nist cla.use in the new constitut1Q 
adopted at the convent1en. 
Clearl)" the new leadership in the CIO-PAC reflected the new determin ... 
tion of the CIO to clean its house of Communists and fellow-travelers. In this 
respect there 115 a vast difference 'between the PAC leadership after 1949 and. 
that of 194.3-46 except for Mr. IAldley. 
!2!&!!2 C!:!Rai~ ltiteratu:re 
'J.'he most noteworthy teatureabout the Clo-PAC spokesmen and their 
literature is their careless di~agard for the nioeties of sticking reasonably 
close to the truth in their propaganda. 
An example ot this 15 contained in the tollOldng dispatch ot Mq 2, 
1948 from Washington, written by the Washington Bureau statt of the PhU.del~ll1i 
Inquirer. Quoting the art:1.o1el 
Jack Kroll, Chairman ot the OIO Political Aotion Committee, had a 
date to speak at the Textile Workers (CIO) convention at Atlantic City 
last week, and asked his two-man publio relations departrnont.. to write out 
a. dratt speech' tor release to the press. The speech arrived at newspaper 
offices a day' or so ahead of time, and one statement attracted a good deal 
of attention--an allegation t hat Senator Robert A. Taft (R., 0.) spent 
20 ~v Worker, October )0, 1943. 
21 !!! Io~ Tae!_ AprU 11, 1946. 
14 
~3,ooo a month tor tood. 
An enterprising Ohio reporter called up the PAG otfice in Viashi.ngton 
to find out what the source was tor this nice high, roWld, tood \mdget 
statistio. The publio relations man on duty was not the one ~o wrote 
that part ot the speeoh so he oalled his side-kiok in Atlantic City. The 
si<ie"'"l.(ick said he thought iroll had told him to use that tigure, but wait 
a mi111te, he would uk Jack. Be called Washington bac;~ and said Jack 
thought he bad read it in an QUo newspaper. Washington suggested that 
the Atlantio City man call the CIa people in Ohio. This the Atlantic 
City man did, reaching a conac1entious member in Ohio, who called the 
major newspapers in the State. 
The upshot was that nobody in Ohio had seen or read the statement and 
that Kroll and his publici t1 department are begi.nni~ to wish they never 
heard of tood budgets, particulat.ly Senator Tatt's. 
Other cro literature has similar examples or t'Wisted tr';.l.tha or false 
representati.ons. Not that the OIO-PAC is alone in this respect, tor the Re-
publican Party National. Headquarter' $ oounters with scme of the most exaggerate 
statements this author has ever CQAe across. Seemingly enough, it is just "parl 
of the game" as tar as those who are involved are concerned. 
The oro News ot June 27, 1948, published a PAC report attacking the 
Eightieth Congress' tax bUl, tor example, as a "spare-the-rlch" tax bill-
''Wealthy families get big tax: outs, the rest of us get peanuts. ,.23 Actually, 
the Republican tax reduction bill took six mUlion low-incame t~s ott the 
tax rolls entirely through increase in personal exemptions) and gave 71 per 
cent ot the total income tax. reduotion to the people nth incomes under tlve 
thousand dollars, only 29 per cent going to those making o~er five thousand 
dollars. Tax cuts to low-income families were percentagew1se much greater than 
22 P!QladslEhia Inquina:, Mq 3, 1948. 
23 Q!2 News, J UM 27, 1948. 
to the rich. 24 
The so-called ·Speakers· Book of Facts" for the 1948 elections put 
OI.lt by the CIO-PAC contains almost anything but tacts. The material, while 
cleverly done, is studded with inaccu.racies so llWrlerou.s that it would. be a 
major task to try to list them aU. 80me of the slanting is annoyingly- vicious 
Some PAC pamphlets are biued and. colored, fllll ot innuendos rather 
than honest facts. Some are propaganda leanet. tirst and last, without re.-
pect or regard tor the truth. The 1mpl.ication is always the same-that every-
thing the PAC wants or stands for 18 good and benefioial; all else is a plot to 
orush labor or to exploit it. The material i8 cleverly written and illustrated 
and wel1-presented.. It packs fin unquestionable punch, if' one is 1d.lling to 
overlook the distortiol18 • 
.&It these were not theollly discrepancies that the PAC had. Although 
011 and the Clo-PAC eventually ended up in Trwaan'. oamp (and on Trunum's pos 
convention campaign train as it rolled through OhiO)' original17 tite,. had no 
nthu.siam tor Truman· s cand1dacy_ 
On the 29th of AprU, 1948, addresBing the TextUe Workers Convention 
Atlantic City, Mr. Kroll had in effect eat -.ide President Truman and. open! 
dmitted that the CIo-pAC was looldng tor. 4 candidate "who wollld. show a super-
ati ve type ot leadership. tt Kroll atatedJ 
It is Mr. Tru.rnan'. m.1atortune to have succeeded Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and what he d.oes s\lfters by ,,_parison with that great President , " • • It 
24 Source matel":1al on CIO-PAC in private tiles of a member of' the 
House of Repr •• ntati Tes made aVAilable to the author. 
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The whole_~stion ot the CIO's position on the Presidenoy is still 
to be deoide.~ . 
eIO-PAC instead threw all 1ta 'Right behind a dra.f't Eisenhower move. 
As Doris Fleeson reported trom "fIashi~ton on .May 5, 19481 
Through the error ot a maUing clerk, the dratt Eisenhower maneu.vers 
ot Philip Murray and his CIO are out :in tbe open. 
·Operation Eisenhower", a pamphlet keyed to newspaper headlines that 
Eisenhower can be drafted, is reaching the public in envelopes marked 
o Io-PAC. Inquiries developed that while CIO-?AC paid tor the pamphlets, 
the envelopes ere a mistake J it had been intended t~aU them ul1d.er 
the &eg18 ot Americans tor Democratic Action • • • • 
A. ye.ar later, in Januar:r, 1949, relations between PAC and AJ)A. did not 
appear to be so 010se.27 According to Asher Lauren ot the Petroit .!!!.!. 
lI1lwauke., Wis., Jan. 22nd - Prominent UAW-CIO leaders also connectec 
with the Americans tor Dtamooratic Action (ADA), an elite group ot liberall!, 
strove today to conceal & !U1xture of shock and chagrin. 
But try as they might, tn could dismiss lightly the blunt pronounce-
ment by Jack Kroll, national director of the CIO' s Political Action Oem-
mittee (PAC) requ.esting the ADA to .tlay ~! our (CIO) people •••• tt 
"Let the ADA organize liberals but. st.ay away trom 010 people on it.at.e 
and local levels," Kroll roared. "There is a 11&80n between the two 
organisations at the top level. That ought to be sut.t'icient.," (The iS~"8 
was on whether a union member should contribute his dollar to PAC or .4DA)~ f' 
Seemingly satisfied with very flimsy evidenoe ot Eisenhower t. vi_s ox 
issues, particularly labor issues, the CIO-PAC nevertheless went overboard 1n 
urging his candidaoy.. As reported by Robert S. Allen ot the North American 
. , 
25 AP, CharlottJ Observer. April ,30.. 1948. 
26 ~.. Lou.is ~ Di.patch. May $.. 1948. 
27 ADA 18 now partiallT incorporated in the IVI J Independent Voters 
ot Illinois. 
)7 
Newspaper Alliance on }lq .31, 1948. 
Behind this latest 010 (pamphleteering) move tor Eisenhower is the 
strong conviction of top CIO offioials that the tormer oh1et of statt can 
be nominated at the Democratic Convention. They are also conv1.ncecl that 
Eisenhower can be "drafted. It 
In both these views, the Laborites see eye-to-eY8 with ott1cials of 
the ant1-COBl1ll1nist Americans tor Democratic Action. There is no formal 
tie-up bailween the CIO and the ADA, but both are strongly opposed to the 
nomination of President Tl"Wnan. 4180, both organizations are Ve'I:1' 'buT 
behind the scenes mobUiz1ng atlf#1 .• Trwnan votes at the Demoarat1ceonventi 
It was authoritativel,. leune<l that demonstrations of CIOand.ADA 
opposition to the President". oandidaoy will be staged at certain achednl 
ed stops on his (pr .... convention "nonpolitical") transcontinental tour. 
These demonstrations 11'111 takt. the fo~ ot newspaper ada, large poste 
on his line ot travel, ana the, tU,stribution of literature among the crow • 
It was stated eraphaticall,.t.h5'>there will be no at tempt to go beyond 
those "orderly .xpressionsi(.d1,.pproVal~29 
J-.ck Iroll himselJ" cam.~t. tor Eisenhower. For example, on the sixt 
of June he told a CIO aud1enee in Providence. Rhode Island, that he thought 
kwnv the man the,. wanted to bethet 'next President of the United States, and 
he exhorted them to make their Qe(';1Gl1on known then to partY' convention dalega I 
Kroll af'terw...rds told al;re}»rkr that Dwight D • .E1senhOllfer was the m 
he h4lcl1n mind. -,Everywhere you go1n the count17", tI he said .. \'t3Q1l hear Ike' a 
name mentioned. People are certain he can be elected and the,. want to see 
1t.".30 
It was not u.ntU the siXth or Jill)" that Eisenhower finally and u.mrl.a-
takably made himself understood that he could not be drafted tor the post • .31 
29 Oharlotte Observer. June.l, 1948. 
30 rxortdence Journal.j~ <7, 1948. 
31 !!!. Im Herald Tr1!aune. July 6, 1948. 
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The Eisenhow8r-bent-fl" .. -ot--nlind 'WU not all inclWlive as might firs 
. 
suppose. "Three major un1ons--textUes~ steel and clothing tldled to endorse 
Eisenhower or to take any outspoken position in their annual convent10ns.-32 
'1'h1e lett the PAC in an embarrassing position. 
'ollowing the July 6th message from Eisenhower which killed the PAC's 
campaign for him, on July 8. Director Kroll announced that he had wired James 
Roosevelt ot his intention to attend the pre-convention caucus at Philadelphia 
called by the younger Roosevelt and seventeen other Democratio leaders for the 
purpose or seeking SOBle alternative to Truman as party nominee. Kroll ~d 
Roosevelt that the OrO-PAC is not committe~ to "any Presidential or Vice-
Presidential aspirant, avowed or unavowed, If hut he added significantly to 
William Knighton, Jr. of the Baltaor& ~ tll&tc 
Clo-PAC, however, is committed to an open oonven:tion to the end that 
a ticket may be selected in a democratic manner, tree of interference 
from those holding high otfioe or the strings of politioal patronage. 
The stress of the times is such at this time that we mllst rely on the 
oommon sense ot the citizens of the country to choose leaders oapable ot 
meeting domest;j and international crisis of today and the immediate 
future •••• 
.But as the dissenters were to lind, President Truman had. already 
sewed up his nomination, which came on the lirst ballot early in the morning 
or Ju.ly 15, 1948. 
!!Q. Backs 'I;r!!m~n 
The CIO-PAC did not inwediately jump on his bandwagon. 
)2 !!!! Rewb1\e, July 19, 1948, 6. 
33 Baltimore ~n, July 9, 1948. 
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On July 22, Direotor Kroll began to .edge a little closer to Mr. tru .... 
man with a. Milwaukee announoement that President Trwu.n "has .. new look now, 
and I must say tha.t the new look beeomes him.· It oould have been that this 
"new look- of truman' 8 did not have an opiated. etfect upon the CIQ.PAC, hilt 
ra.ther that they jllst surrendered to the inevita.ble diotum of the party leaders 
Addressi~ a CIO United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers Union conven-
tion, Kroll repea.ted that neither the CIO nor the CI<>-PAC had yet made a. presi-
dential endorsement. But he added. "It may be that the plain people of the 
United States have found another champion. It may be that President Trwun has 
found himself.- Kroll continued by praising the Democrat platform, andeond~ 
ing the Republicans.34 
Finally, on August 31,. the eIO executive board endorsed by a vote ot 
thirt.y-five to twelve the Tru.ma,.n...Barldey ticket, and agreed to throw its weight 
behind it.35 
Meanwhile, as the split began to widen within the CIO and the GIo-PAC 
twhioh, in the last analysiS is the sa.'lle, the political boundaries took their 
torm on both sides. 
In the CIO, lea.ders of thirtywone of the forty-tour international. 
Ilnions, with a total memberShip ot about 5,000,000, have tormally backed 
Truman. Officials of twelve other u.nions, totaling about )$0,000 members, 
have come out tor Wallace either boldly Of6cautiously. One union 1s 80 
evenly split that it has endorsed no one.)' 
The explanation of this overwhelming sentiment. among Ilnion leaders 
1s not difficult • 
.34 .AP, Baltimore Sun. July 23, 1948. 
35 Phi+adelR~a Inquirer, September 1, 1948. 
36 flew .ReJ>Ublic. August 23, 1948, 11. 
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ne reason given was the awakening Of the President to his new Deal. heritage. 
nother, more significant, is f~ in the u.nhappy alternatives to Trwna.n-an 
anti-labor, GOP Administration, as olearly foreshadowed by the Eightieth Oon-
gress, or 'the rise to power of the CaMlunist-Wluenced Progressive Party. Far 
as it was, PAC and other labor organizations were out-maneu.vered by their £81-
lows-i~s, the professional politicians. They had no choice. The dilemma 
as accept Truman or else. 
4round this time, the CIO(}ecidedto talk tor Harry 5. Truman for 
President and since they had been out-gsI;.sraled, to work for a Democratic Con-
gress. The decision to back the Democratic candidate again in 1948, in spite 
of all the seeming faults labor had had to find with the Truman record came as 
soon as the CIO found an opel'ling. 
~ Cssgn Tac"tics 
The CIO Political Action Oommittee admittedly was seriously weakened 
by the withdrawal ot the lett-wing unions led by Albert Fitzgerald ot the Unite 
Electrical. Workers, who had formally-joined the Progress1ve Party-
PAC, however, had iJlproved it$ basic methods ot operation since the 
last electionf{ In 1944 and 1946: JIo-~AC put on a great show, with tons ot 
literature and hundreds ot speakers stumbling and running out tDOIl headqlulrters 
into the cOtlntry. But its organizational underpinnings were shuey_ It was 
," 
long on propaganda and short on ward and, block work. "Piles ot Imdistricllteci 
literature left over from t.he '46 campaign are stUl stacked in dark corners ot 
local limon halls throughout the coUlltry today. n37 PAC tried another method in 
37 New !!-eus1ic, Allgu.st 30, 1948, 12. 
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the 1948 oampaign. It sent literature into t~e states only on request-and the 
local unions paTed tor what they got, so the material was being distributed. 
In the 1944 election, PAC was a. hyperthyroid instrument of agita.tion 
and propaganda which tried to convert eVerybody', bombarded the count17 with SQIIl ~ 
eighty-five mUllon pieces or campaign literature, and managed to made itself' a ~ 
big an issue as Roosevelt and DeweY. By 191~8, however, Kroll had rebuUt the 
organization into an old-fashioned machine with the block workers, not the fane r 
pamphlet writers, as his key men. "Only' 10,000,000 pieces of campaign litera-
3~ 
tare were dist.r1hllted this timet am. local unions and PAC' 8 had to pay tor them ~. 
It is readily nnCiersta. ... uiable why the vast majority of the labor lead-
ers in this country were dead set against Wallaoe. l\D1ong other things, Wallace 
cae out with a statement in !!! Re~ub~~ (hetore he resigned as editor) which 
Barel,. mnBt have _de up their minds. "I never had anything personally against 
Truman, but I wa.s troubled about the tarces which put h1lIl over as v1ce-preal-
dential nominee in 19W~ ... '9 
When the political aplit came within the Cle>-PAC, it obvionsly weak-
ened it tor the political campatgn ahead. The PAC could not endorse Truman 
without risking the practical secession of p~al1ace unions. But when the 
lett-wingera moved to greener pastures,the CIQ...PAC IIlOre than held its own. 
As a reault, !!! ReP9:bUc reported SOI1lething that was soon to prove 
false. "Pro-Wallaee unions prObably wUl not formallY' break w.1 th the PAC, 8ll3' 
more than theY' w1l1 withdraw tran the 010 itself • • • ...40 
38 Hu.gh Morrow, Saturd!X Evenipg ~, March 5, 1949, 29. 
39 New R!psbUc, July 19.. 1946 J lB. 
40 lew Rep\1bl1o, February 2, 1948, 36. 
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One thing that they did pt'edict was that the left-wing unions would 
use their dollars and campaign work for Wallace-ror-Preeident committee and 
various state lfprogressivefl parties. 
Ilridge l s Longshorem.en had already shied away from PAC contributions 
in 1948, although it was not generel.ljr known; they had also railed to contributt 
substantially to the CIO·,. Southern org<nddng campaien. 
Ja.ck Kroll, director or the OIO-PAC, u spokesman tor that organizati( n~ 
told what labor's stake in the election was. To labor, the issues were m.ore thi n 
politics. They meant their bread and bu.tter, their civil and political r1ghts, 
and security ot the country. 
As tar .. labor was concerned, the Eightieth Congress drew the issues 
sharply. The "rea.ctionary" Repo.bl1eans, in their eyes, teamed up with the 
Dixiecrats to scuttle every move to provide the" American people with adequate 
housing, the guarantee or civil rlghtsunder the Constitution, blocked health 
insurance, stripped millions ot Social Security protection, gutted the Labor 
Department, crippled the TVA, allowed high prieD to eat up the savings ot the 
'Wage earners, and enforced the spare-the-N.ch tu policy. 
As Kroll put it; 
The American people suffered these things f'rcrn a reactionary majority 
in Oongress when there was a President in the White House fighting the 
people's battle. ~bat should we sutter under a President hand-p1cked by 
the great interests thatl grew fat upon the dominant policy that grew in the £ightieth Congress14 
Jack Kroll, pointing out that serious attempts to organize labor po-
litically on a year-round active basis was not started until 194), stated that 
41 liatioe, October 16, 1948, 426. 
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no matter how the election turned out "the work of the PAC 'rill go on...42 
This had always been. and still is, one of the major defects ot the 
CrG-PAO. They try to go into c,:mpetition on a part-time basis with organizatio s 
that !unction year-round. 
During this election, BS in past elections, PAC registration drives 
were the highlight of their spade work:. Henry Murray, New England CIQ..PAC Dire -
tor declared that he was out to register everyone he could get his hands on 
"since in Connecticut, a 5 per cent shitt decides a .Republican or Democratic 
Victory.043 Hence labor's turnout could; and did, decide whether or not Cheste 
Bowles, the V_ocratic Ca.ndidate, would win. 
l2.Wl Election ResultL!, 
Despite these close tie~ with the Democratic Party, PAC did endOrse 
six Republlcana. This led to an odd situation in Vermont, where PAO suppori,ed 
Republican Governor Ernest Vi.. Gibsons for re-election. Gibson won. 
The unendorsed Democratic candidate, who was defe~ted, therefore was 
understandably surprised when be received a telegram from Kroll after the 
electiol!4 congradulating him on the viet-ory which PAC had helped him not 
to win. 
It was one of a large she at of telegrams which Kroll's staff' dispatch-
ed that day; and when told that. their man had won in VermOlnt, the man in charge 
!of sending the telegra.l1s naturally Gl.sswned that their man was a Democrat. 
As early as September 30, Kroll told a news conference in WuhlDgton 
that Henry Wallace and his Progressive Party were no longer "to be taken ser-
iously, It and because of heavy registration, he said that he 'Was Sllnt that the 
4) naw Repqbllc, October 2$, 1948, 12. 
44 Hagb Morrow, SaturdaY EveniIU! f2,st, March 5, 1949, U9. 
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Democrats would regain control ot both houses pi Congress.45 
On October 7, he even went so tar Ei-S to count Ohio's twenty-tive 
electoral votes in the bag tor 1'ruman.46 
'then on October 21, at a Washington news conferenoe, Kroll made the 
flat prediotions that, 
(I) President Truman would win. 
(2) The Senate would go Democratic, and 
(3) ·We're going to surprise an awful lot ot people by having a 
Demoora.tic House." 
Kroll added that 1'rumant s vote totals would be a surprise and that 
the Gallup and other polls were "oft base somehow, r don't know how. n47 
Huch has been said and written since the 1948 election camp&ign in 
depreciation of labor's oampaign role.. But still it must be pointed out that 
.Dewey carried the inchstrial states of New York, New Jersey, Pen.nsylvania, Mich-
igan, Connecticut,; and Delaware. 
Kroll and the PAC contended that Wallace cost Truman New York and 
}Uchigan. And in Michigan, despite the tact that. Truman lost it, the PAC sup-
ported candidate tor governor was victorious. In Pennsylvania, several con-
gressional seats were picked up by the PAC. The gubernatorial cf-.. ldidate with 
PAC endorsement won, along with three of the six H.ouse candidAtes. Also, & 
PAC approved SEmator was elected in Delaw&rEt. 
45 Louis Stark, li!!! Yqrk "U.~!, Ootober l, 1948. 
46 Edwa.rd Kernan, Cle'lel<m<l PlaitJ. De!:!er, October 8, 1948. 
47 James Haswell, Ch1cyo Da11;y; ~ .. October 26, 1948. 
8S 
All told, Kroll guessed wrong-in the Kroll Poll ma.de public on Oct-
ober 26, 19M~--on ifa,ryland# Indiana and Michigan, which went Repu.blican when he 
thou.ght they would go Democratic, and on Wisconsin, Idaho a.nd California .. which 
pleasantly 8ul~rised hL~ bJ 8oir.g Da~ocratio. He also forecast, incorreotly, 
tha.t halt of Florida's electoral votes would GO to the Dixiecrats. 
Kore important, from PAJ's viewpoint, were tho 137 PAC conzreesmen 
elected to the Uous&,seventy-eight other PAG endorsees having been defeated; 
the seventeen rAG-supported senators, out of twenty-one endorsed; and the foqr-
teen PAC-backed governors, out of seventeen endorsed. 
And 'in the White House sa.t Harry S, Truman, still President ot the 
U ni ted States. 
Here is an excerpt from the Clo-PAC victory news edition of November 
22n 1948 entitled. 
Here is the CIO-PAC Box Score for November 2nd eleotion: 
House of Representatives 
Candidates endorsed •• 
PAC endorsees elected • 
PAC endorsees defeated 
Senate 
Candidates endorsed • • 
PAC endorsees elected • 
PAC endorsees defeated 
, . . . . . . .. . • 205 
• •• ••••••• • 135 
70 • • • • • • • • • • 
.. . ... • • .. .. . .. 
• • , . • • • • • • 
· . . . . . . " . . 
19 
15 
4 
48 Researoh Div1a1on, Republican National Committee, !!!m2!a E!£, 
II. t'bmber 15 .. 
State Governors 
Candidates endorsed • " 
PAC endorsees elected " 
PAC endorse.. deteated. 
· " 
. . " 
" " " ". 13 
• • • • " . • • •• 11 
• • • • • • • • • • 2 
THEY WON'T BE BACK 
86 
There will be 11 lot of missing faces when the new Congress sits on 
J anu.ar;y 3. 
They are taoes of die hards and labor baiters, of union busters and 
errand boys of big business. Most ot them were beaten on November 2, did 
not ohoose to run against the tidal wave of votes that swept the reaction-
ary Republicans out ot power. 
Here are some ot those T(ho .. ."n't be back: 
Senators) 
Joseph H. Ball (R., Minn. ~ CfW~;a.nd Brooks (R., Ill.), C" Douglus Buck 
(14., Del.), Henry C. Pworabak (R:"", Idaho), George A. tillson CR., Idaho), 
Ed H. }Ioore (R., Okla.), Tom St."rt. (D., Wyo.), and Chapman Revercomb 
(R., W. Va.) along with Edward V.dtobertson (R., Wyo.). 
, 
Representatives) 
Fred A. Hartley, Jr. (R., N. J,/), Rose R131ey (R", Okla.), Harold Krutson 
(R., Minn.), JLu: Schwabec,(R"t Mo.), lIiarion 1'. Bennett (R., Mo.), and 
Charles J. Kersten (R., 1f18.). 
Oddly enough, in this same election, one ot Kroll' 5 best lriends ... 
t'!harles P. Taft, the senator's less-conservative brother, who was elected to thE 
~incinnati C1ty Council with the help of Kroll's Almalgamated Clothing Workers. 
Not only ~as this election a victorious one tor the Democratic Party, 
Put (although credit "hould "have been given to the farm vote, too) it also 
. 
~stab11:shed Kroll in the eyes of all.. As Hugh Worrow put itl "Like President 
~, Kroll became a leader in his own right as a result of last tall·s 
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election, not merely the bumble echo of & spectacular predeces8or • .49 
Tharecan be no denting that Kroll was one ot the lew political lead-
ere to predict with reasonable accuracy the election results. "Only two people 
thought Harry wOIlld make it, It he is quoted as saying, "Harry and me. "SO 
49 ~cat!£dal !!fIltM £.2!!, March 5, 1949, 119. 
50 Ibid., 29. 
CHAPTER V 
THE OfF -YEAR &LECTION OF 1950 
Kroll likes to make the high-sou.nding statement, as he did on January 
21, 1949 at. liilwaulcee,Wisconsin, that; "We are not Democrats and we are not 
Republicans. We (re not going to attempt to capture the Democrats or the he-
publicans and we are not going to be capt1lred by them •••• nl 
For the answer to that .. it is only necessary to cite the story ot wha: 
happened in the State at Michigan to,Uowing the successtul campaign conducted 
by the CIO-PAC tor their candidate tor Governor, G. Mennen Viilliams in 1948. 
First there was the repol't of December 18, 1948 by Asher Lauren, Stat 
Correspondent ot the Det!"!!; News. as tollows; 
Lansing, Michigan, Decembtnt 18th-a six-man steering coDmitte. to 
handle applioations ot ero me.mers tor Stat. jobs ander Governor-Elect G. 
Mennen Williams was named here tOnight by the CIO Political Act.ion Com-
mittee (PAC). 
The action came at a conterence ot titty PAC leader. at"ter a survey 
by CIO researchers showed between 270 and )00 State jobs exempt trom civil 
•• rvice and subject to patronage. 
The co.umittee will make recommendations to WUliams tor appointments 
• • • • 
AUg',lst Schoole, president at the ~tate cro council and !:.lute PAC chie 
stressed, however, that the cro does not intend to go thog wildt about 
tUling all the jobs with CIO members. 
1 UP, Wuhil.?jton .I!.!!! Herald, January 22, 1949. 
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I I do not 'Want to sce the CIO made into a lousy patronage organ1-
zation, ff Schoole told the PAC leaders. . 
He sud the cro is interested in only t about a half dozent of the top 
State jObs and in some of the less important posts. ,. • • . 
Patronage on the county level would be allotted to the variou.s county 
PAC committees under a resolution adopted at today's cOnference •••• 2 
Then on February 5, 1949, The New York Times ran a special report trOJ~ 
Michigan. S&1.d the TimeaSl 
Orand Rapids, llichigan, February 5th ... -Governor O. llennen Williams sto d 
by quietly touT" the Congress ot rndu.strial Organization took over the 
reins ot the.d)emocratic Party at one ot the largest gatherings in that 
political group's hiBtor.y_ 
Instead ot the Governor becoming titular head of the party in tra-
ditional tashion. August Scholle, president of the CIO State CouneU, and 
chair1u.n of the union's Politicfll. Ai-ction Committee, assumed leadership. 
, Jr. Schoole presented a slate ot candidatea to be nominated tor the 
spring eleoti;.)n.. He wrote the Ust on the back of an old envelope 41ld 
presented it to the party's leaClers in a small room. 
And there was littJ.e dollbt but tl'lat !rll SehQllet 8 list ot can.d1d&tes 
would be adopted by the convention. • • ,. 
Subsequently, however, the OIo-Democra.t slate oL candidates nominated 
by the Democrats at their StateConvent1on was rejected by the people in tavat: 
ot the Republican slate in the AprU election. The campaign was tought on the 
major issue of -::ro domination ot the Michigan State A<binistration. 
Taft Viot0tlous 
President 'l'ruman was reliably reported to have told a labor delegatiO! 
at the White House that "we 're going to trim the pants ott Bob Tatt in 1950. n4 
2 Detroi:!( News. December 19, 1948 • 
.3 !!! York Times, February 6, 1949. 
4 Satw;'da..., Evening Post. Jlarch 5. 1949. 29. 
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And so developed one ot 1950's "hottestR campaigns--41he soene or which was 
. 
Ohi.o and the 80l1rCe of the frietionwas Senator Robert A. Tart" running tor re-
election. To the CIO he was the author of the "infamous" Tatt-Hart-ley Act. To 
the Ohio Association for the Advancement ot Colored People he was the father of 
a voluntary fair emplo,yment practices bill which defeated an enforcible Terlion 
The Ohio Association ot ManuJ."acturers, on the other hand, found him the valiant 
defender ot corporation tax reductions and the opponent of "burdens_elt govern-
mental controls. While at the same time, the people ot Ohio tound in him the 
statesmanship qualities to beCOIl18 one of the greatest sons of Ohio. It was not 
surprising .. therefore" that theae interest grollp8 should reel anxious to partic ... 
pate in Taft's re-election or dete8t. 
The Ohio Democratio Committee in 1950 showed DC particular enthll8iaa 
about nominating cand1datea, expanding party organisation, co-ord1nat1ng intern il 
party groups and campa1gni.ng. Some political sages explained ita inactivity as 
the result ot a bad case of internal t'actionalism. The committee was composed t 
a number ot weJ.1.....organ1zed and practicallY' autonomous county parties. Some of 
these county le~der. displayed little l.ove tor Governor Lausche, a po11ticiano. 
independent strength, who dazzled voters with claims of t/independent from cor-
rupt local pold"ty machines." Despite their teelings, however, these county dele-
gates knew where patronage came trom. They duly elected a uLau.ache man" chair-
man ot the caumd.t tee. The cha1rman took no chances with mut iny. The state 
partiy aho_d so little interest in other candidates that some politicos even 
aul'mised that Lausche had entered san. "deal- witJl the RepubUcansJ he would IX) 
press a strong Democratic candidate aginst Senator Tilt in 1950, provided that 
the Hapublio&l'l8 would not press Senator Brioker against Lausoh. in 1952. .Ia a 
.. 
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result .. the Democratic Party nominated a rathf.!r weak candidate, Joseph ferguson 
Ohl0 State Auditor .. and not a real match for Senator Robert A .. Talt. In 1IJl:3 
case, the attltude of the state party offlce toward Ferguson was so cool as to 
be hostile. At any rate, PAC's cry for help diu not result in whole hearted 
support from the Democratic machU1e. 
Some people are of the opinion that FergtlsOll was a weak candidate. 
Admittedly', he was not a vary strong candidate, but who was there that was 
stronger? Nonel The passivity of the state conrn1ttee almost ineYitab1;y called 
forth an old-time politioian like Ferguson who could fend for himself. As 
state auditor, Ferguson had been able to control ab(.)llt six hundred jobs tor sb 
teen years. 1'bis gave him the nucleus ot a personal organization and indepen-
dent contacts with the county parties. Only such a candidate could supply the 
politlcal resources and local party co-ordination necessary to run a successful 
primary- and general election campaign. So PAC turned to him after their favor-
ite son, Murray Lincoln, a liberal prainent in the Farm Bureau was turned down 
From PAO'I stal'ldpo1nt, he "lAS lIl11ch better senatorial material than 
Fergllson. But Lincoln had neither a pet'$onal machine nor the 8Ilpport of the AF 
or even the Farm. Bureatl. He would ha.ve had to depend largely on PAC to pu.ll h1J 
through primary and general elections. Betore the primary, PAC tried to get 
Ferguson to withdraw in favor of Lincoln. When Ferguson refused, L1ncoln, with 
the coneurnance of PAC, decided not to make the raee. Lincoln and PAC reokoned 
that they could not mllster sufficient ;>r1.mary votes to win such a contest. PA.C 
thereupon .. ga.ve IIp the nomnation idea entirely. It told its members, "Fortun.-
ately', this year unusually well qualitied men are seeking the Un1 ted States 
aenator1al nomination on the Democratio ticket. Allot these candidates are 
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oommitted to a policy ot placing the welfare at the people ahead of the profits 
of special interests. • • • 'l'he Ohio CIO-PAC is making no endorsement in this 
race. It) 
The Issge! 
The ma.:L'1 isstl8 that J10 President Philip .Murray wanted to base the 
elect.:ion on 'Was unemployment. Late in June of 1950, Murray attended a PAC rall 
and addressed the group to elect a -::;ongres8 that would meet its responsibUitie t 
tirtly actual topio today is unemployment. The trend since 1947 has been for un-
employment to increase at the rate at one million a year. And it evidently 
continues despite an unprecedent era of so-called prosperity.1t6 
Other main issues at stake in the campaign were' 
1) Repeal ot Taft-Hartley, 
2) Improvement ot Soc181 Security; 
,;) Renewal ot Rent Control, 
4) Paasage of a FEPC Act .. 
S) Defeat of the Jiundt-N1,).;on Bill, which, to the union, had the fain f-
idea that it endangered civil Uberti.IS, union rights, under the guise of tight-
subversive activities. 
6) Enactment of an EmtJrgency Unemployment Compensation Act. 
BUt as election time drew closer, the political nick was gorged deep~ 
with Taft on one side and la.bor on the other, separated by the Taft-Hartley Act 
lroll contended that "Ferguson, unlike Senator Taft, knows the problem.s or 
5 Monthly Labor hevin, United States Department ot Labor, March, 19 0, 
6 ISIlli Nns. XIII, Number 26, June 26, 1950. 
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Bu.t even at that, PAC's exposure would not have been 80 bad it its 
puolic relations had been better. The only large papers to anderee Ferguson 
were the Dayton News ... the Sprinsfield~, and the l:/'fl1Caster Eagle aazat!:!. 
Many papers like the Y0,tW6t/!town Vindicator were bitterly anti-labor. Fear ot 
socialism, vaguely defined, was reinforced by the extensive advertising of the 
IiAlt and the iJiA. .Even potentially compatible interest groups beoame afraid 
that combinations with P/\.C would be a tlkiss of death." l'he upshot of all this 
was that li'ergllson did not .. have a chance against the great statesman and power-
tul Taft who ha.d all the tricks in the deck. Taft rolled to a decisive victory 
~ ~ !!l !!!! fork 
In New York, the PAC reverted to different tootics as once again the 
ALP came into prominance in a major eleotion. This time the American Labor 
Party met more opposition than ever before. 
The United Labor Committee otNew lork City held its first meeting in 
June ot 19>0, with three thouaand repre.sentatives ot the CIO and JL unions 
attending. 
The committee was formed the previous year to work together political T 
and on other matters of general labor interest ~ But this particular meeting 'We. 
the first held tor the delegatee from the affiliated locals, where plans were 
la1d to~ unified 81.lpport of liberal and progressive cand.1d41.tes in the election 
of 19$0. 
TheT combined wi. th Demo~atio, Republican and .Liberal leaders in 
1 .2!2 lews, illl, July 3, 19$0. 
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backing tormer State Senator James G. Donovan as a "tripartisan" nominee to 
defeat. Representative Marcantonio of the Am.eri~an Labor Party-.8 Donovan won. 
!!Q Aot1oR ~ Michhian 
In liichigan, the eIO-PAC tried to take over the state partY'_ "We are 
not accepting the Democratic Party in llIlicbigan as it now ia. Our pu.rpose in 
going into it is to line up with its liberal elements and remold the Party into 
a progressive torce. n9 
Shortl,. thereafter, most of t.he 01d Guard interest groups turned to 
the Repllblicansl They formed t.he Dentoorata for KellY' Olub (Kelly was the .fIe-
publican candidate tor governor). That leader of this club said' "Leaders who 
have turned control of our party Over to nonpa:rt1aa.ne with Socialist back .... 
grounds and others of their ilk. oannot expect true DemoCl~ats to be complacent. 
I know of hundreds of good Democrats who teel the Democratic label is being use ~ 
10 to advance ideologies to which we Jsannot and will not, subscribe. If 
August Scholle, state CIOp·resident claiIned: "The overwhelming 
majority or the regular Democratahaf.s welcomed 115 into the party with open 
arms. They find no difficulty in workl.ng with union members on a wholesome and 
oo-operative baaia. nll 
Both the phraseology a."'ld U~e content of the 1948 and 19$0 IiU.chigan 
Democratic platforms indicated that the party, under PAO issue-oriented intereS' 
6 l!!! ~ Nna .. ml, Number 2$, June 19, 19,0. 
9 Michigan £:!:.2. New!, Ii&rch 1.. 1948. 
10 Uetro1t free Press, October 11, 1950. 
11 :.ach1i&n £!2. News, Karch ;;, 1949. 
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groUP .. a1aled it. appeal at a ptart1oul&.r segment or ltiehigan'. YOter.. It did 
. 
attempt to please ev-eryone, u the pr~v1ou.s p&.tronage-orient.ed party had. 
Xlfh The state Democrti.tio party platt"orm stated. IIFor this Nillol"d or indU-
venee and hostility to labor's interests the .d.epubllean Part,. stands COD-
Idelnne·d. 111s wmocratio Party believes th ... t the prosperitY' of t.he whole stat.. 
pendl on the health, seouri ty, and digni t,7 or the workine; man. ,,12 Ke1l71 the 
publioan oandida:te for governor was beat b;r 1 .. 1:5h votes. 
'l'h! t!!8ultl 
J\..ll during the C6IIlpaign ot the 1950 ott-year election, the PAC WAUl we 
are ot the opposition that they were taeitlg. The g£ ~~" rsportEK1 that; 
"the HAM i8 Plotting on a no-ho1ds~d, brasS-knuckles oattlptdgn ••• and. it" 
oaN are to regain e,:mtrol. ot Cong:Nea aod to erJ-nvinee COlle~()8amen that 
abor has no political potter. And tlut Wt has found n.."1 ways to pp&nd monel. 
t t. not pouring 1 te ru.nds into the party tills. The cash 18 g:01ng d1notl,y to 
e party oand1dat.ea. • • • «13 
Bu.t deap1te all thie moneysp,-lnt b;r the: Kepu.b11cQn& and their suppa 
ra. the Democrat-a c11d Slake 80m. ga1ns. :\8 Kroll put itJ "It wasn't an ott .... 
&r. slaction for the people.·14 
lroU's oOl8ent on the election was that' "Insecurity and u.ncertaint: 
lu.enee the vote. tt15 
12 ~g!l1i!!! CIP liftl. votober 5, 1950. 
13 Th! Q.!Q ".1 XIII, Number 2), JU.flG S. 1950. 
14 'lbB ~ N$w$, lIn, lumber 44, October 30, 19)0. 
lS .'!llt ~ ~ XlII, t1wtber 46, November 13, 19$0. 
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These resulted from the oomplex situation in whioh the people then 
. 
were engaged as a result ot communistio aggression elsewhere in the world. 
The people were concerned. over the possibility or worlM1de conflict 
with its hardships in terms of casualities, shortages, increased taxes, and the 
other sacrifices. 
The most notewort.hy defeats suffered by the Democrats weret Their 
majority leader Scott Lucas of Illinois; their majoritY' whip, Frcr.ncis Myers of 
Pennsylvania; the chairman of the Labor Committee, Elbert Thomas of Utah} and. 
the chairman or the Armed ServicesC-ontmLttee, MUlard Tydings of Maryland. 
One so called reactiOnary, out of all the targets, fell before libera: 
attack-Forrest Donnell (R.) of President Truman t • home ~tate of Missouri. He 
was deteated by a comfortable margin by Thomas Hennings, Jr.16 
Union label, when hung on candida.tes for Congress, turned out to be 
a liability, voters ot 1950 preferred avti-union stands. 
Republican gained, Democrats lost in many cases where labor was the 
big issue. Qovernors, too were ca.ught in the tide. This otf-year election 
found a total of 234 Democrats in the rk'tlse as compared to two hundred Repub-
licans and one Independent. The election itself resulted in a net gain ot 
tw~nty-eight Repub1iee.ns. Notable gains 'were registered by Indiana and I11ioo1 
!iepub1icans. They gained an increase of tive and four members reapeetively.l1 
And when Ja.ck Kroll, CIO Political Action Committee Director 'Was 
~ed to .. gS:v:e his .1de1L.ot .1'lAAt .. happened in the 19,0 elec"don, he side-stepped 
16 ~. 
17 u. s. Ne!s And World Re2~rtJ November 24, 19,0, ,2. 
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it by answering that "we just didn't get enough votes .. " But later on he added 
tha.t "I think the menbers of our unions, by and a large, yo1ied to their own 
best interests, which was the recommendation of their CIO Political Action 
Committee. u18 
At any rate, the Twelfth Constitutional Convention ot the CIO, held 
in Chicago, ended on November 24, 1950. On that day they released the state-
mont, that: 
In the t ace of the setback experienced by labor in the November 
elections, the Convention made pinna tor conti~ed political activity 
looking to 19$2 and a radical mo~ification f§ labor legislation by a 
return to the principles of the ltagner Act. 
16 Interviews With Labor .l..eaders, u. s .. !!!! !llS!tiorld .t:I.8eorh 
November 24, 1950, 2$. 
19 Monthly Labor Review, }lovember, 19$0, 11. 
CHAP'1.'EB. VI 
Labor's political campaign for 1952 got off to ~~ aurly start, with 
chief interest centered in Congress. Union leaders fig~1red that they needed 
to add nine seats to the "labor bloc tf in the Senate and thirty-six in the HOllse 
to get pro-labor legislation through C ongross. 
To get a. good start, tho 010 planned to take an active part in the 
primary election campaigns. TheiI' idea was to get a pro-labor candidate nom-
inated by one party or ttl8 other J phrticularUy the Democra.tic Party, rather 
than wait until the November vote If! 
CIO' s Political. Act,i~m Com.m!.ttee, headed by Jack Kroll, warned the 
Democratic leaders that tlhis organlz'3.tlon would not support ':second-rat.· 
candidates just bec&Use they har.~pened to be Democrats. 1t1 
Ba t these words of warni~ were not to be taken seriously" sinee the 
C1O-PAC supported Sparkman despite his poor record in the light of labor 
standards, partlcularily those of the Congress of Industrial Qrga.~lization. 
~ HeJec~ Barklez AbrtlEt1x 
Labor started out looking like a powerhouse in the Democratic Con-
vention. It shoved. Vice-Presid.ent Alben Barkley right out of the race for the 
1 u. th. ~ ~ World .Reeert, January 4, 1952, 4$. 
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Presidenoy. It got nearly everything it wanted in the platform.. It worked 
. 
effectively in state delegat.ions for rill. changes requ1rlng "loyalt.y oat.hs-
to the convention's nominees. 2 
At that. pOint, a lfell-kt)OWll Midwestern editor, Roy Roberts or the 
Kansas Clty Star, wrote with some justif'icatlon that labor lfat" the dominant 
voice in the convention. 3 But lab~pow€lr had already started to fade by t.hen. 
The Barkley episode boomeranged, as the labor leaders themselves 
realized al,most immed1ately.4 
The rules victory was negated ,!,hen the convention seated the three 
rebellious Southern delegations. \ 
Then . labor initially ba~ked lOSing candidates both for the PresidencY' 
and Vice-Presidenoy.> 
It 1fas the way'labor reno~~d Barkley, an old friend, more than the 
i-
renunciation ltaelt, that rebounded: as a piece of bad public relations. Both 
George M. Harrison, President of 'the AFt Railway Clerka, and Jack Kroll, 010 
Political Aotion Committee's director, were convinced that James Farley wu 
plotting to recapture the party through Sarkley-..... nd they regarded Farley as a 
New Deal deserter. 
Barkle7 had inYited elO and A1L convention groups to breaktast on the 
2 Buainegs!!H, AugUst 2, 1952, 103. 
:; Kanay City ~, ... ugust 1, 1952. 
4 Business Week, Augu.st 2, 1952, 10:;. 
> Ibid. 
100 
opening day ot the convention. Instead ot waiting until then to bre&k the news 
to him, the two labori tea announced to the press the preced1ng afternoon that 
labor could not ba.ck Barkley; he was "too old" tor the job, they said. By 
breakfast time the next day J everybody was aware that the Vice....President was 
playi~ host to his own political executioners. 6 
rhe atir this created among other labor lea.ders, nota direct part,. 
to the anti...Baricley statement, was profound. For a time it looked as tho\lgh 
Harrison and Kroll 'Would be repudiated by their own people. Actually, it did 
come close to that. 
George Meany J then JU'J;., seoret&r,y-treasurer, Charles J. ItacGO'I'en, the 
BoUma.kers· president, and other AFL people called on Barkley to aseure him of 
their personal e8teem and to _phasiu that the AlL as an organization bad not 
done this to him. Tbis took sane explaining, becAUse one ot the breakfast 
gu.ests was James L. llcDevitt, director or .AFL's Labor· a League tor Political 
Education.. Harrison did not show up tfll' the breakfast date. 
Philip 1Iurrq sent 1:18 personal counsel, Arthur Goldberg, and Jame8 
Carey, C 10 secretary-treasurer, to usu.rp Barkley's wounds.. He also .'ent a 
telegram to the Vice-President, in deeply personal terms. 
KeanwhUe, a well-known Republican, John L. Lewis, moved in to ex-
ploit the Clo...AFL blunder. Through press agents on the scene, and through a 
United l4ine Workers district president" Sam CfddY ot Kenttlck,r, Lewis ripped 
into Kroll, Harrison and one of his tavorite targeta--Walter Reuther ot the 
CIO's United Auto Workers. 
6 ~. 
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As tar as candidates were concerned, Governor Adlai. ;:;'tei Jn80n was 
labor's third choice. Averell Harriman and Senator Ester Ketauver were ahead 
ot him; both were 'i'aft-Hartley repealers, and that was what counted. 
In particular, most o:t the .liFt group were for Ketauver. One of them, 
f. C. Carroll ot the AFL's Uaintenaace ot Way Employees, lambasted Stevenson 
on balloting day, calling hill,.an election loser. HalTison first campaigned tor 
Harriman, then switched to Stevenson "hen the New Yorker withdrew. 
The CIO leaders privately preterred Harriman, OOt tor the record, 
sott-pedaled this early preference. Some Stevenson sentiment showed up in the 
lower 010 ranks, but the top echelon managed by some chicanery to keep it quiet 
All that the record showed, untU the lut day, was that anyone of the three 
c&nd1dat •• would be acceptable. F1nally, the CIO called on its people to vote 
tor Stevenson as BOon as they could discharge their state commitments. 131' that 
time, they were merely embracing the inevitable candidate. 
Labor and supporting liberaJ. leaders were rebutf' ed in the selection 
ot Senator John J. Sparkman ot Alabama tor Vice-President. The Democrats wante 
support from the South. 'rbe PAC wanted Ketauver or any northern "liberal ff tor 
the number two spot. TheY' regarded Sparkman's civil rights votes &8 a liabUit 
among minoritY'-group vOter8. Further, they said., he blur8 a principal labor 
campaign issue because he voted tor 'l'~rtley in the Senate on the initial 
vote, then later switched to sustain Trumants veto. 
Here was the UIlU.su.al circum8tance whereby the CIO had to repugnate 
the man they wanted tor president just a t_ years betore, and supported Moth 
man whose principles were not in eontormance with those at the 010. The 
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connexion between the Democratic Party and the CIO' 8 Political Action Committee 
was too strong to be broken. 
Labor leaders at the Democratic Convention ostensibll weN speaking 
and acting as individuals, not for their organizations. But the fiction ot 
nonPaz:t.isanship tooled nobody. 
The contrast 'With the Repu.blican oonvention was obvious. William 
HutcheBon of AFL's Carpenters was the only top labor leader at the GOP session. 
The oro was strongly represented at the Democratio show; and-since 
it is a more closely knit group-acted. as an organiza.tion. Handouts were issue 
in the name or its PAC. Kroll and Reuther, neither or them delegates, directed 
things from the Palmer House. 
In all, ero and AFt claimed "more than one hundred" delegates carried. 
union cards. 7 
As to whether Mr. Stevenson 'WOuld receive arv support tram the PAC, 
the only thing close to it was a statement that: /I ••• a strong teeling 
prevailed that it Mr. TX'Il.mall ran again, despite popular disproval, he would 
have the support of the cro ... 8 
An inclination on how labor leaders thought their membership would 
vote, came in a pre-election poll made by the official newspaper of the AFL 
!Machinists. Ballots received by the CIO, AFt and independent union heads, 
revealed that Governor Earl 'tI;,arren of California, 1rou.ld receive more support; 
~rom the unions than any other Republican. At the same time, Senator Paul H. 
7 B~.iness Week. August 2, 1952, 103. 
8 II = S. !!!!.! AnSi v';0rld :9pgrt, January 4, 1952, 45. 
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Douglas of Illinois seemed tho likely Democrat to get the ·okey" frcm labor.9 
. 
Walter Reuther was credited with a major voice in the selection of 
Adlai Stevenson as the Democratic nominee for President, though this is open 
for debate.10 But at any rate, Walter Reuther and his associates in organized 
labor did not kid themselves politically. They were beginning to 'Work in a 
practical, daily manner to further laborts political interests, something that 
was lacking before. 
CIO-PAC considered this election as a fight tor survival. Down at 
PAC headquarters in Chicago, John Alesia, PAG Division Director, State of 
Illinois, and Larry Keller, Health and Weltare Division, stated that it the 
.Republicans won the election it wculd be the end of unions. They thongbt that 
t.he Republicans were holding the Taf't-Bartley law over their heads, and when 
the time came, they would let the axe .fall. To them it w;;uld mea.'1 a time ot 
reckening, heads would roll and Wall Street would rule. U 
As the political eam.paign rolled on, union papers blasted the GOP. 
They upheld Stevenson-Sparkman and the Democratic Party in general. There were 
certain (but tew) Republicans endorsed by them. The Illinois State Industrial 
Council (CIO), published the endorsements of candidates in their union paper.12 
The constant cry of the rAC was ftyou never had it 80 good." Union 
9 ~. 
10 Statements of J oM Ale81& and Larry Keller, personal interview. 
ll;·~. 
~ .. 12;: Illinois Labor, Illinois State Industrial Union Jouncll, CIO, 
tl .................. 10 
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[papers continuall;r preached against the Republican Part.y. Steel Labor stated 
it,hA't.. it Ike got in, Ilnemployment would develope. People wollld once Blore be 
salling apples.1) 
General Eisenhower was pictured as the avowed toe of labor. Sttel 
lLaborq~otEldthe President as sa~ that the General "had apparentl;r made his 
peace with the author of t.be Tatt-Hart.le;r Lq. Apparently his eonduct will not 
be out ot line with the .Republican platform, which 1s the most anti-labor plat-
form they have submitted to the country in at least sixteen years.·14 
This was certainly strange considering the foraer PAC stand on 
Eisenhower. 
Pamphlets by the thousa.nds We" printed by the PAC tor the working 
man to influence him at the polls~ This h f!Q.1 led the parade. It told whs.t 
PAO 'Was about. Next they gave the workers liher! !E. f!Q Dollar GO!s. Thoae 
rwere the groundwork for wbat was later t9 cane. It was worked into a tine in-
doctrination to swing their votes to Stevenson. 
With this framework lud, they next countered with 11 tt1ebooks 
pointing ou. t W1eJIlplo;yment ud the .fatt-Hartley Law .15 
Then the PAC came out with one "AQout Prices". '1'his one lfexpla1ned" 
why prices were high. 'the price inf'1a.t.ion that began with the Korean War spran 
fran two 8ou.rce8-prof'iteari~ and the refusal or the conservative coalition 
13 S~!et Labor. United Steelworkers of' America. oro OctOber • 1952, 
1'V11, Number 10, 1 • 
14 Ibid. 
-
15 Tart-Hartley,!..2l i'aqt8, OIO-PAC, ibmber ). 
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dominating Congress to give the government adequa.te oontrol powers.16 F!re1q. 
. 
PoliCY and PolitiS!' also got, their names into print by the pil.e. They argued 
in favor ot tho "Marshall Plan," among other pertinent items. It was a highly 
aeared opera.tion. It must be admitted that the men in charge truly believed in 
what they were doing. Vi'ork was taken for granteg during this election, the,.. 
never ceased. They kept going dq and night. 
The PAC later came out with a booklet on The Facta. ED C~d!telh 
giving the background of Adlai Ewing St.evGnson.17 In it, the)" gave quotes from 
newspapers concerning Stevenson's favorable disposition of Alger cass,la and 
also a statement issued fran the Illinois State House dealing with the same 
issue.19 On the whole, it seems that Stevenson did only what any citizen con-
cerned with the proper function of our judicial system would do. 
As the day of election drew near, the PAC passed out "Voting Guides" 
to ite workers in the union. It told them exactly whom to vote tor. But as 
TJe now knOtt, this went tor nauaht.. 
They also prepared other booklets to influence the voters, such as 
~ !~ ~A SeC!!le 019 Age. All their pamphlets had a distinct Democratic 
flavor. 
OIO-PAC early ill 'the campaign, started a drive to get its members 
paid "tinle-otfD to vote. No matter what their politics, everybody seemed to 
16 About Prices, ,!.g Facts, CIO-PAC, Number 1, 2. 
11 '!Ox!.2e. Cand1datfs, CIO-PAC, WuhillJton, D. c. 
18 Peter Edson, Wuh1nglon DaUz.!!!!, April 5, 1952. 
19 !!'.!toW Daill!!!!!., April 16, 1952. 
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a.gree on this one point; that registering on the company's time was the answer 
to the problem ot how to b'rf. ve workers an opportWli ty to get on the county 
voting lists. 
CIO-PAC lwsmered at this ralentlessly for months. The theory being, 
"a large vote, a Democratic vote. tI Many companies echoed the "register to 
vote" theme with placards, in employee publicati;;ns and by personal appeals to 
I'workers. Still, however, in many states the work~rs were among the largest 
groups of non-reg2.strants. 2O Yet the CIO-PAC made sane progre88 in Bflcuring 
paid time-off for the workers to vote .. notably with Jolmson and Johnson and wit} 
the Line Material Corporations. These are ju.st a tew, but it showed a trend 
I'which most of the employers of the country followed Buit. 
The unions did, hoWever, shitt their campaign tactics .trom those used 
in previous elections. U'hy'? The neW' insight 'Was the result of the lessons theJ 
learned in 1950. CIO-l:''AC now stated that they should avoid taggine a candidate 
as pro-labor. They now inswcted t.heir men not to talk too loudly about 
"purge.,ft and not to "gang up." 
The CIO-Pi~C made a list ot "don'ta rt for their workers: 
(1) "Don't boast about 'purging' a candidate in advance of the 
election, even it he is the man you want to beat. ,,21 
This "l"'J.1e or thumbft came out. of the Ohio Senatorial C~n ot 1950 
when unions 'Went overboard to "purgeR Robert J;.. Tart. Tat-t, consequently ear-
160. 
20 Regist.ering on the Company· s Time, Business Week, October 4, 1952J 
21 Unions Shift Campaign Tactics, U .8. News ~ World. Report, OctobeJ 
17, 1952, 77. 
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jried the state by a large majo:dty, including inmetrial areas where the unlorus 
~ad their largest concentration at power. 
(2) "Don't label a candldate."22 
. 
ibis also Wa$ high on the list of advise to local unions.. The idea 
twas that it was perfectly all riCht to cOOperate with other groups in bacld.ng 
~ candidate, but not to put a IIlabor candidate" tag on him. It was logica.l.ly 
reasoned that voters did not like to think that a man in office wu "owned" 
by any single group. They (the voters) like .to thi. he wUl vote in the in-
terest o! all the people. 
(3) "Don't stress imerunion committees • .,23 
This was to avoid the appearance of throwing too much 'Weight against 
a candidate and to a.void advertising that labor was "out to get him .. " Aocord.i.nj 
to a pamphlet edited by Mr. Jack Kroll, in the 1952 election, there were rewer 
jOint committees of members at the CIO, ;I1L and other unions. These grou.ps lYe~ 
working separately, although in most oases they endorsed the same oa.ndi.date •• 
Union support, as the campaign neared an end. was contined largely to 
Democratu ca."1.didates. In some areas, the PAC, as well as other union organiza-
tions, backed the entire Democratic ticket, fran Governor Stevenson clown to 
oounty off1ces" Occas 10nally, however, a H.epuhl1can got the support or the CIo. 
PAC. 
22 Ibid. 
-
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The other ea:npaign tactics ernployed by the PAC did not d:1.tfer from. 
ithose used in paet elections. Getting workers registered was still one of the1l 
tprinciple tasks. Labor organizations in several st.ates had conducted extensive 
campaigns to see to it that union members "'ere eligible to vote. One of the 
imost elaborate dri"lfes made by the CIO Political Action Committee was conducted 
in New Jersey_ 
They corrpilod a roster of all CIO members in the state, broken down 
by precincts. Names were checked a.gainst registration lists and workers not on 
those lists were urged to register. Election officials cooperated in setting 
\lP registra.tion desks in plants (likf3 Johnson and Johnson Company) and employer, 
gave time-oft to those who wanted it. 
Precinct workers were agd.n supplied by the Oro-PAC and other ~:nions. 
Democratic political organiza.tions 69.W to it that members got to the polls on 
Election Day. Before the election, they ran~ doorbells and distributed leatlet, 
on the election "issues" llk. the .')nes that have been mentioned. Leaflets by 
the millions were printed by the OIO-PAC. 
Speakers were provided by tclS unions just as they had done in the pas • 
In faot, the CI(';"PAO printed a Speakers Manual tor its men. It oontained the 
"dots and dontts" of publio speaking and other helpful intormation. Labor lea~ 
ers, fram the higher echelon ot the oro down to local union orrioials, took the 
stump to back their tavorite candidates. The organization provided money tor 
nation-wide radio and 'I'V speeches by union leaders and for speoial programs 
aimed at tll'l.pporting candidates. 
Voting records of m.embers of Congress 'Were also distributed by the 
CIO-PAC as "guides· to their memberll\l. The "guide8" showed how each Senator and 
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Representative voted on key iSSQes selected by the labor leaders. 
About t~s time, people were wondering 1£ labor oonld rally the vote. 
Labor leaders were puzzled and distu.1"bed by the apparent. political. apathy ot 
union members. 'I'his wu scheduled. to be the :rear of the 'ibig push ff for politic 
action. The CIO launohed it by taking its top brass, two hundred strong, to th 
ii1lite HOIlee lawn tor a pep talk trom Pz!eeident Truman. 24 .oJ.t tram all over, 
union officials were reporting listless responses from their constituents. 
Contribiltions to (HO' s Political Action CQlJlnittee were slow coming in 
Union-sponsored political meetings were scantily attended. Those who did atten , 
were alwaya the same ODeS. 'l'he rank and file was exhibiting a general lack at 
I interest in matters political. This 8Ilbstanci&.ted the theory that the working-
men wID tallow their labor 1euders in ecoIlO.lnic but not political matters. 
When they go to the polls to vote, they go as individuals ar.d not u a class. 
B\lt, even with this flhandwl"iting on the wall,!l some union official. 
working the political t'ront professed that they were not worried by the le .. • .. ..-....-,. 
Arter all, 1948 was a surprise to averyone. dtlt one thing that labor leaders 
failed to consider in this polit:!.eal .parallel. was the climate that the farmers 
were nu.tured in during 1948 to 1952. 
Some u.nion officials saw 19.$2 as another 1948 campaign when an u.Il-
demonstrative electorate .\cept ita own connael 80 weU that the expertis mis-
calulated the st.rength ot' pro.Truman sentiment. 2S Bu t these union officials 
were in the minOrity. A majority were seriously concerned. 
24 "Can Unions Hally the Vote,'/ 13usiness!2J.!5.., October 18, 19:>2, 1.50 
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E1eoti2Q aesu1ts 
A8 things turned out, General. Eisenhower 'IrOn by a landslide 48 shown 
in the following table. 
Landslide For Eisenhower 
Popular Vatesa 
Eisenhower 
Stevenson 
Minor partie. 
Electoral VoteSI 
Eisenhower 
Stevenson 
Key States edge tor Eisenhower; 
_ York 
Ohio 
nUnois 
California 
texas 
55.1 per cent 
44.5 per cent 
.4 per cent 
442 
89 
851,000 votes 
505,000 votes 
470,000 vates 
6)0,000 votes26 1)6,000 votes 
Standing among the Nina or the 1952 Political Action Campaip, Jack 
Kroll .. as able to tind only a fn sourf,;es of consolation. Chief among 'thes8 
was his opinion thii.~, wWe some labor votes obVi9\1sly S1VIlng to the Repu'blicana 
the :tabor vote as a whole limit ted 181>5 than the non-labor vote. 21 St.ill, he 
reainded h1s membership that If ...... O~ll1eral ~i8enhower bad been elected Pres-
ident ot all the American people and that. be is entitled to their support in 
oarrying CKlt the duties and obliil,atiQnB or that. high Of'tice.,,28 
'.the most dramatic shifts, Kroll pointed out, were in statee where the 
C10 was weakef:rtl' .. ....'Florida, '£exaa, Virginia, Maryland, 'tennes ... , Arizona, New 
26 "Polls liS Election Guidea, tl ~ !!!m And World ueper;" November 
14, 1952, 32. 
21 Picld.ng Up the Pieces, !grtune, December, 1952, 83. 
28 lionthll Labor R!ng. November, 1952, LXIV, _ber 5, 111. 
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Mexico and Oklahoma. But he sa.id nothing ab01lt the smarting clefeat. su.ttered 
where CIO was strongest, such as Ill1oo1s, lew York and Ohio. 
But a.t a.ny rate, it is probably worth recalling amidst all the curreIl" 
derisiolll ot the "labor vote," that labor leaders never claimed (except in the 
earlY' days of PAC)that they were able to swing elections. 1'hey did, however, 
believe that between two-thirds and three-quart,ers of union members were nor-
mally Democratic, and that their propaganda etforts lnight raise this range by 
several. percentage pOints, and that 1t they could get union mGn to the poll. 1n 
greater numbers, they ndght, thougb it 1s doubtful, tUt a lew marginal areas 
iuto the Democratic column. hilt Uyou consicier a poll conducted by Mr. Gallup 
it shows an increase ot one per cent in union members voting Democratic. 29 
All these rel'lectloIlS could Il()1~, of course, offer much solace to a 
man like Kroll, who had predicted .t,isenhower lNuld get It fA maximum ot one hun-
dred and fifty" electoral votes)O 
Of twenty-one senatorial CaI'l.didates endorsed by the CIO, which stayed 
out of campaigns in states where it hi),d little membership, such as North Dakota 
thirteen were beaten. In the Hollse cau~aigIl.s, the results for labOr were 
equally disastrous. The PAC endorsed ant! foaght for 2)8 congressional cand1dat s 
but only" 134 were elected.31 In ~di ti.on, control of the ~enate Labor Oommitte 
passed from Murray of 14ontana., a warm i'riend of organized labor, to Senator i'a.r 
01 Ohio (who later died), CQ-au. thor of the :i'att-J.i.artley" Act. 
29 How Lahor Votes, Annal8 9.! the Am.ex:tc8n Acadm .!2! fg11t1cal !WI 
Social Scienge, .l4arch, 1951, Cc.tnlV, 12h • 
.30 Pick:Lng Up The Pieces, l<~ort!!2!' 1952, .December, 8.3 • 
.31 Ibid. 
-
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Labor's defeat followed a campaign that. it had fought energetically. 
The PAC raised close to one million dollars in vcluntvy contribut.ioDa, halt 
ot which was spent in Washington on national 18Su.e8 ant.i halt or whicb remained 
tor local oampa1gns.32 i'llis was a tar ery from the 'three million dollars in a 
war chest that had been reported. 33 
Aside from the monetary upect or this election canpaign, as compared 
with previOlls campaigns, there were two major changes in the CIO effort. It W&l 
concentrated as much as possible in the so-called "3 per cent areas, ft ie., 
states or congreuional. di$tri~ct8 that were won or lost by less than .3 per cent 
in the 1950 mid-teN elect-lonEh Secondl.T, except in industrial areas where it 
was sure ot its strength, the PAC stre.sed the loyalty of lts approved cand1 ... 
dates to the Democratic platform u~ the slogan ot "you never had it 80 good, 
rather than to the stander. ot the CIO. 
Before the elect10n,at lost, the new techniques appeared to be work 
ing smoothly. In Indiana, for exrr..-nple, the PAC made no attempt to budge aolidl 
entrenched Republiea.ns, but instead,l1.m1ted its e.tf-ort to seven of the eleven 
Co~ressmen, the silnator1al campa.:1g~l of Governor bchricker and 'the gubernatona; 
campaign of John Watkins. The PAC, working closely with the Ali'L unions, hired 
:about two thousand five hundred oars to deliver voters to the bOOths. In SOl1th 
Bend, Indiana, the Auto Workers even set aside an emergency .fund to buy' BIlOW' 
chains tor their ears in case the weather sl1ddenly turned for the worse. 
32 Ibid. 
-
3.3 Un10na Put The Heat \.in Voters, U.S • .!e.! And World H.eWt, Allgu.st 
29, 1952, 70. 
Throughout the 8tate, the PAC had twenty-three fuU ... time political workers, in 
addit10n to hundreds of part-time volunteers. It spread around the state more 
than a mUlion oopies o£ four campaign pamphlets J it sponsored, on fifty radio 
stations in the state, about three rebroadcasts per station ot Senator Alerse'a 
main speech tor Stevenson; a.nd it lnade sure that union men worked in olose co-
operation with Democratic precinct capta1ns.J4 But in those areas where PAC 
strength was weak, they did not function at all'. 
StUl, in the main event, labor elected only one ot the seven congres 
sional cnndi dates it was eI1dorairu..:; in Indiana and. saw its aenatori&l. and guber-
natorial choices defeated. 
Jack Kroll, in his report to the .. au execut.ive board, expressed con-
fidence that 70 to 75 per Ctmt of the 810 merllbers had. followed 'the recommend&-
tiona of their union leaders in the Presidential. balloting. 
It is no sellSe oono"titutes a victory tor the Re:publican Party or the 
ideas Nsociated with the Republlcan Party. It wu a victory tor a. hero 
••• ~ld cannot be conptruec as a repudiation of the principles,ot the 
Naw Deal and the Fair llul. • ... No signifioant realignment of parties 
has yet taken plaoe in the South ami control ot poli:Ucal machinery ot the 
Democrat1c Party is st111 lodged in the same hands.)5 
PAC hetrenches 
-
In all, it. wu a smaahingrlct017 tor the Republicans. Labor, with 
all its backing of the Democrats, was defeated in a perdue fashion. The pori 
ot their hopes wu utterly di8801Ved in vapor. They believed tha.t since the 
Repuhlican Party was in power, the ax would. tall. 
34 Picking Up the n.ece8, 'ol'tSD8, Dec_ber, 1952, 84. 
35 lIlissioa Accompl1 .. fu.td, National Precinct Viorkers, Inc., Chicago, 
Illinois, 1953, 13. 
Then there ware rum,bing$ that the CIO might su.apend its national Po-
litical. Action Committee for four years to save money. But this was opposed by 
Chicago leaders of the union group. 
John Doherty, who was the persoaal representative of PhUip Murray in 
Chioago, sAids "Cra.-PAC must be mt.LatGdnedin some form. We must have some 
polltical instrument, local or n&t10;1&1. ".36 
A.s an aftermath or the election, in which the labor backed Democratic 
ticket of Governor Stevenson and Senator Sparkman was completely buried, it 
seemed tnat there were only two alterzw.ti'ves for the Congress of Indllstrial 
Organizations; to suspend Clo-PAC for at least lour years, or to lntena1ty its 
activities, work harder and broadfm its soope. It sess that the latter path 
in the one that the Clv hu choosen to tread. 
.hiven as the dust was settling, th.e CI0 we.s making plans for new po-
litioal action. Permanent political action t~OUpS in Cook Oount~s twelve 
Congress~onal districts were being .fOrmed. 
The new plan will break clown the orgCt.Ilizatlon into ward, township and 
precinct organisations. 
William Rocco .. cha:Lrm&n of the Cook Oounty cro Folitical Action Com-
m1.ttee aaidl 
1952. 
We are establiShing com:'uittees in each district a..ll<1 a oom.'idttee in 
each ward. 
We ere not going to do it over .1l1ght. We are butlding ward by ward. 
We are doing it slowly a.nd solidly'.·:H 
36 CIa Split Issue of Lisbanding ~~C. Ch!9!i0 Daill !!!!, November 7 
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It did not take the C10 long to rip into the E1senhower Admin1strat10 • 
Victor Riesel, reporting in the Herald-hmerican on Walter Reuther t s speech at 
the United Auto \Yorkers Convention, states that he "slashed at the H.epublicans 
as Y-Otl would expect, II before he sta..""'ted a. demand for a third party)8 
Then the PliG switched from the genera.l to the more specUlc when it 
ripped at the new labor law draft. 
'rhey- cUrged the changes 'WOuld make the present act ~orse~ than it 
is. And they renewed. their demarld that President .Eisenhower send Gongress his 
own recommendatlons. 39 
but still the gulf widened between the CIO-PAC and the new Adtainis-
tration. 'fiben John Edelman ws.s rejected bl the administration as cro·s eandi .. 
date for usiatant secretary of lab(¢, the C1u flatly refused to su.bmit another 
010 is fully in the oppositiol".!. now. 'l'be story is that it would have 
blasted Eiser.hower from 1na.u.~l1ratV)n dayan, oot didntt want it to appear 
to i t8 members as a SruT grapes action. The high strategy adopted lut 
January was to wait tor some ilSUB 88 which to break withthe adminietra-
t1on. The Edelman slt~ation1s i~~ 
The top echelon of the CrV-r-Ai.! began picldng up the stll&llest deta.1ls 
to throw baok at the Republioan8~ "C1Q.l:eaders who are checking up on how mch 
time the President takes oft tor gull utrongly urge a thirty-five hour week, 
with a goal ot thirty hours a few years henco. ~isenhower might like that, 
too. 041 
38 Her ald-Am.eric an, March 16, 195.3. 
39 Chi9!&o Daily News, May 231 19$3. 
40 Ch¥;a.go AmeriCM. !I(ay 26, 1953. 
41 Detroit!!:!! Prep, atq )1, 1953. 
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It wu not long before tactics, issues and timetables tor the 1954 
. 
election were being laid by the PAC. 
Harry TrWllan sat in an off-the-record luncheon 1.'"1 June ot 1953 with 
some old friends and allies. These old friends were labor leaders. 
The luncheon came nine years atter the day in Chicago when .. little 
known Missouri Senator walked into the political headquarters of the late 
Sidney Hillman at the 1944 Democratic Convention. 
Truman told the Cro-PAC leaders to practift seU-restrain.. He said 
that the ottiee of the presidency-was the "greatest, moat responsible,job in tb 
world. tf He said it would be "unfair to lambaste Eisenhower" this early in his 
adrdnistratlon, that no one could "ma.ster the ottioe" in so short a time. 
Traman pointed out. he could not "ethically'" now attack IIIlee. tf It 
would lend the impression Truman wsa stUl trying to run the country' on the 
basis of what he had been privy to as president.42 
At srr:r rate, the PAC leaders did not take the adrl;ce or Mr. Truman 
when it came to the critioal attitude they took of President Eisenhower and 
his associates. It was significant to not.e that the CIO-PAC is atill wed to 
the Demooratic party leaders at least in its friendliness. 
The ero-PAC 1s beginning to realise that ita political power ill not. 
only advanced by pamphlets, money and speeches, but must have substantial mem-
bership in which to exert this influence. Consequently, organizing campaigns 
have taken on political consequences. Unless the unions can go into those 
fields which are not organized, a large potential "voting bloc" will be lost. 
42 Victor Riellel, Caicago American, June 29, 1953. 
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Unions are particularly aware of this now. They teel that their 
political aetbacks in late 1952 were due, 'in part. to la.ck of support trom 
the big unorganized white-collar or salaried work force. They teel, too, 
that labort 8 economic and social programs willurand a far better chance jJ 
the whit8-collarites can be drawn. i.ilto unions. 
But prepara.tions~e still only preparations. Only the results or th. 
1954 otf-Y'ear election returns will give us the answer to how suooessful the 
PAC plan-or-attaok was. 
43 !~nion1z1ng Otfice Workera,u Business !!!!, July 18, 1953, 121. 
CHAP'l'ER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
As was seen, the "rea.ctionary" ott-year election ot 1942 led directly 
to the formation of the PAC. But the question ariaes a8 to whether 0:" not. the 
eIO was justified in establishing such a boc;tr to dalve into the politioal tield 
The answer seems to be in the affirmative. Goverment, mare and more 
had come to delve into the problema and affairs of' labor. Therefore, &8 a mean 
oL survival, labor had to enter the politic~ arena where questions oL legis-
lation were effecting them, either directly or indirectly. The logical OIltcome 
W8$ based upon the sound policy ot non-partisan political action. With the •• 
thoaghts in mind, the 010 launched 1t.& Political Action Committee. 
Two tactor. aided the lucce •• tul drive at this Want organization. 
First. was the powerful and appealing ca.nd1date that it backed dur1ng 
the 1944 presidential oampa1gn-Frankl1n D. Roosevelt. In all due reapect to 
the PAC, it must be stated that it rode to victor.)" on the "coat-taUs" or a 
great _tel' politician. 
The second. tactor which aided the Political Action Committee was the 
guiding gen1u.s ot Sidney Hillman. To him the PAC ow •• a great debt. It .. u hit 
powerful mind and superb knowledge of' political Itrategy that activated it to 
its fullest extent. 
ll8 
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It proved to be a wise choice on the part of the 010 when it placed 
Sidney Hillman at the helm of its Political Action Committee. For like Gompers 
Hillman's socialistic tr&ini~ proved an asset. Be saw t.hat the sooialistic 
thoughts would not fit into the American way of lite. With these thoughts in 
mind.. it W&8 no wonder that Hillman approached the task with such a highly 
practical spirit and rejected the path to a third party_ 
HUl.mans next venture to capture the American Labor Party was a 
brilliant move. The ALP was the dominant labor political organization in New 
York. OOllpled with the fact that the New York electorial vote far exceeded tha. 
of any other particular locale. 
Therefore, it was only logical that H1llman would want to gain the 
upper hand in that land of honey-
With this chore sucoessfully tucked. Wlder his belt, Hillman and the 
PAC turned their attention to llart1n Dies. L1es 'Was out to break the PAC, but 
this time PAC cli.d deliver the vote. With the increase 01 union personnel in 
Jefferson Oounty, 'I'exIls (dne to war wo.rk), the PAC wu able to ra1ae registra-
tion by about 20 per oent and thus offset any maj ority Dies might have bact. 
But that was a small isolated district. When it came to the nation 
as a whole the Democratic Party teared that the PAC would hurt rather then help 
the cause. However, atter a time the peSSimillD of £(oosevel t subaid.ed. and the 
Democratic Party went all out to gain labor's support. 
Still, as the Democratic Party was trying to consolidate, the PA.C 
contimed its backing ot Henry Wallace tor Vioe-Presiclent. It was a known tact 
to PAC leaders that high ranking Democrats opposed Wallace tor many reasons, bu. 
still they insisted on his candidacy. It 11'." onlya.tt.er they became convinced 
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that Wallace could not win that the PAC went along .nth Trumarl. 
The campaign tactics used durin-Z the 1941.\ election were laid upon the 
premise tha.t clever literature could do more than actual door to door canvusilli • 
The PAG as yet was not stron!! enO'tlgh in actual number to cover each and every 
ward in the country vdth repl'esentatives, so it relied upon n slick campaiGn 
of pragmatic literature to do the job for them. 
But with all this, there is no direct evidence that PAC was respOJl.io. 
sible for the el&ction of Roos$'I.felt and the other New Dealers in the 191J.J. 
Presidential election. 
In 1946 it was a ~jj'ferent story. Both Rooswelt and HUlman had 
passed from the seeM. The people were becoming critical of labor as a 'Whole. 
PAC began to lay back on its laurels, not realizing that it had to fight harder 
this year to maintain what thEr.1 al.ready hal accomplished. 
During this time there were still Calls for a third party-primarily 
from the Sooialist-mlnded segment of the C1O--but they WBJ:e rejected. 
And the 010-.I:"AC were very disarJPointed \vith the Trurr:an Administration. 
ifhile they did no;:, openly oritize them, the.! did not giv~ them their wAole-
hearted support. 
Atter the campaign of 1944, flAC talked much of expanding its dq-to-
day act.ivities in 7i'rards and precinots. But it '.'ras Just lip service. As the 
election day grew' closer and closer, it beCQIllG evident that they were relying 
~ore and more upon the tactics used in 1944. The results qre a. reprint of the 
taotics-a stunning defeat. Candidates ca.rrying PAC support were buried under 
an avaJ.a.nQhe of opposition votes. The landslide ";/U extremely extensive. It 
even covered areas where labor had al'If~V'S been strong. 
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Then, when the FAC was placed upon the apron ot pOlitical defeat, 
the internal conflicts of communistic influences started to gnaw at its super-
structure. 'l'he split between the lett and right-wing factions weakened the 
CIO-PAC considerably. All in all the future looked bleak just before the dawn 
of the 1948 Presidential Campaign. 
But in the first mont.h ot 1948, the OIO-PAC's executive boarci gave 
.. destine resolution condemning the third party idea. for 1948. Then the PAC, 
under the direction of Jack Kroll announced that that organization would not 
back Henry Wallace in his bid f or the presidency. 
This move on the part of tn. PAC had a disastrous etfect upon the 
chances of success for Wallace and his affiliates. Even more serious was the 
effect:,i t had upon the OIO-PAC. An immediate split became apparent &s the gap 
widened. inen the smoke cleared, the OrO-PAC tound themselves smaller in 
number and financial backing, hilt strofJger at the hard: core of right-wing re-
liability. 
With this friction removed, PAC 1mmed1ate1y launched into the 1948 
campaign in the usual literary way. The main task, at least in the beginning, 
was the "Drat't Eisenhower" movement. But inth1a movement they taUed to con-
sider one aspeot. Would Kisenhower accept their dratt proposal" The answer 
waif no. It they would. have found this out in the beginning, they could. have 
saved. a tremendous amount of time and etfort. 
Detinetely, the PAC was against Truman. But as it became apparent. 
that they had again been outgeneraled, they jumped on the bandwagon and em-
braced the man from Missouri. 
After Truman had secured his nomination, PAC moved into high gear. 
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1'he principle campaign methods were rev1Se::l. It now started to develope grass 
root.s of ward and precinct workers, relyi~ less and les8 on their "bright 
little pamphlets. n The results _re an increase in interest" among the people 
at less expense to the organization. 
At the end of the long 1948 campaign road, success was wait.ing for 
the PAC. But was that success earned by the PAC alone! It is true that the 
changes they made in their tactics were all for the best. It is also t1"l1e that 
they worked hard and in the end their goal was achieved. But the final outcome 
cannot be attributed just to the eIO-PAC. Labor claimed the credit tor Truman'. 
election, but they tailed to consider the significance of the huge farm vote 
that also had a bearing on the election of Hr. Truman 
1950 was an entirely different story as the pol! tical pendulum again 
8WUDg back. This campaig~ turned out to be the big brother of the 1946 constes1. 
The words of President Truman, "we' re going to trim the pants otf Bob 
Taft in 19$0,» proved disappointing to the PAC. His political future was of no 
[small concern, especially to the OIo-PAC. !'heir hopes were high because he was 
Punning for re-elecUon in a highly industrial state--Obio. It i8 true tbey 
~d not bave a man strong encu.gh to face :Mr. Republican and it is also true thai 
Ji'erguson d1d not get the full support of all democrats in the state. But still, 
!considering all the potential labor vote that existed in the state, Ferguson 
.hould have done better than be did it the PAC had delivered the vote. 
It would. seem, upon hindsight, that PAC's labeling Taft. tor defeat, 
contending that he was the foe of labor did more to help him than it did to 
ninder him. Consequently, taft ach1eved. a. decisive vietory. 
In New York, the PAC revamped its policies and. combined with other 
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labor and political groups to roll to an easy viotory-_ 
But in Michigan, the PAC made the same mistake that was made in Ohio-
they labeled the opposition as antl-1a.bor. Howev .. , in Aaichigan they tried to 
capture the Democratic P8l'ty mieh proved a f'u.rther mistake because the general 
pu.blio did not take to the idea. These setbacks were cou.pled with the de1'ea.t 
01' other key Democrats, namely', Scott Lucas of Illinois, Fraocis Jlyws ot Penn-
sylVania, Elbert TbOl1l8.$ ot Utah and MUlard Tydings of Maryland. .Bepu.blicana 
gained, Democrats lost in many cases where labor was the big issue. 
Then as the 1952 Presidential. election drew on the horizon, hopes ran 
high tor a Democratic victory. But for the first time in ita short history the 
political cycles did not swing back. 
The first mistake PAC made was in ita rude rejection ot Alben Barkley 
The result was the leader. ot the Democratic Party had an 111 feeling toward th 
labor leaders as a whole. However, the Clo-PAC and other labor leaders were 
quick to see their error a.nd tried. to smooth some of the hard feelings. 
As tor the backing 01' the right candidate, the PAC played ita tlau.al 
role ot being tez in arrears. '!'heir bacldng centered arollnd Averell Harriman 
and only later, when the inevitable candldate started his victorial pace did 
the PAC come wt tor Adlai Stevenson. 
However, in the selection ot a vice-presidential candidate, the PAC 
was torced to nallow its principles. Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama, 
whom the PAC trowneci I1pon because ot his stand on civil rights" got the nod at 
the democratic primary. It did pr.ove one thing howeverJ the CIO-.PAC 18 weddH 
to the Democratic PartT- It the,. .. ere not, then theT would not have given thet ~ 
support to a man 'Who had voted tor the Tart-Hartley in the Senate on the init1& 
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vote and whose stand on civil rights 'Was in direct opposition to that beld by 
the C Iv-PAC. 
But the PAC oontinued its su~port of the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket 
till the end. CIO-t'AC considered this election as Ii' fight tor survival. For 
the second time in its history it began to profit by the mistakes or put 
elections" ..I.t still stuck to its revamped policy ot less propaganda and more 
precinct 'Work. But this time it did. not label a. candidate as being for or 
against labor. Instead it switched to the emotional appeal. ot "you never had 
it so good. 1t 
But even though they~ tried not to label a candidate as anti-labor, th 
PAC could not resist one poke at Goneral Eisenhower as the foe of labor. Appar ~ 
ently this had no effect upon the workers ot the country. )1aybe the workers 
remembered how the PAC tried to II draft Eisenhower." 
Then, as the tinal .~ of the campaign drew near, the labor leaders 
of the ccuntry began to suspect what was in store for them. Some, however, 
refused to believe that they would be defeated. In ostrich tashion they ballev d 
that the eleciionwouldtes14lt in another 1948. But as it turned out Eisen-
hower registered a landslide. 
So in summat.ion it can be said that when the results ot thes~ past 
electiona are studied, the Gampers theor,y must be reflected on; that labor bas 
never been able to sight the perigee of political action. This is not to sal' 
that labor should remove itself fram the political scene entirely because gov-
ernment, since 19.32, has entered into the affairs of labor through legislation. 
Common sense dictates that times have changed and thus ideas should change, bu. t 
what the author wants considered is a reva:nping of the Go::npers theory to tit 
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rthe change that has taken place, not a complete denial of it. What labor shaul. 
do is intensify its lobbying activities a!1d nonpartisan political action prin-
ciples. ll.t the same time they shou.ld continue to shu.n the idea of a Labor Part" 
becau.se it does not fit the philosophy of the American Worker. 
But these manifestati;)ns were unheard. of in the attermath of the 19.52 
election. CIO-PAC headquarters here in Chic,,-go estimated that apprOximately 
35 per cent of her members had deserted it and voted Hepu.blican. Later, they 
denied this and said that their membership voted just as they had advised. l 
1 ~tatement of John Alesia, Illinois PAC Director, personal intervim. 
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1 Statement of John A1esia, Director of PAC, Stnte of Illinois, 
personal interview. 
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